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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the successes and failures of democracy and its institutions in 
post-1975 Greece. As such, it contributes to the area of research by analysing 
institutions such as the constitution, citizenship, popular sovereignty, political 
parties, government, checks and balances, public sector, security, elites and finally, 
the Church of Greece. It is these institutions that have proven to be the most 
important in Greece and deal with the precedents of governance, state-
apparatuses and quasi-state apparatuses. The approach taken in the thesis is from 
a diachronic perspective that historically analyses and interprets how each of these 
institutions has evolved since the establishment of the Greek Nation-State in 1821.  
It also determines the extent to how each institution was functional and 
dysfunctional. The periods covered are 1821-1974, Chapter 2 1975 – 1985, Chapter 
3 1986 – 2000, 2001 – 2007, 2008 – 2016 and 2016 – future. More specifically, the 
thesis analyses these institutions in detail under the numerous Greek Governments 
that have been in power since the Metapolitefsi in 1975. This includes those of New 
Democracy (ND), the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the current 
Coalition of the Radial Left (SYRIZA). The thesis, therefore, puts forth that Greece’s 
politicians in the last 41 years have manipulated the institutions of the Greek 
Nation-State in order to achieve short term goals for personal interests in the 
present. Greece’s politicians have thus shown no concern with developing 
institutions to achieve long-term goals for the interests of the overall Greek Nation 
both now and in the future. A significant amount of pressure for change must occur 
in the country, both from Diaspora Greeks and Europeans, if institutions in Greece 
are to evolve in line with a more democratic nature. Due to limitations, there is, 
however, more room for research to be conducted in this large area. 
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Literature Review 
 
Constitution 
In regards to the institution of the Constitution, the thesis mainly refers to Greek 
Constitutions that covered my topic in great detail due to their originality. 
As an official document of the Greek State, Constitutions have largely been written 
by Western-educated Greeks of the period, namely those with backgrounds in 
politics or law and are often referred to when referring to these documents. 
After carefully reading these documents, it is clear the authors did not have any 
affiliations or sponsors that would bias its contents, largely due to the fact that 
these documents were written solely to outline the precedents of the Greek State. 
Throughout its history, the Greek Constitution has been written solely for the Greek 
Nation so they understand their rights as citizens as well as how they will be 
governed by the Greek State, while at times, they were written to appease 
counterparts in the West. This analysis is supported in the numerous extracts used 
from these documents throughout the thesis, all of which have been referenced 
correctly and discussed by academics in their own work. The Greek Constitutions 
that have been used here were written in 1822, 1823, 1827, 1832, 1844, 1864, 1911, 
1925, 1927, 1948, 1952, 1968, 1973 and 1975, respectfully, and as they are primary 
sources, are open to interpretation in their use by the academic world. Some of the 
most efficient secondary sources available on the institution of the Constitution are 
articles written by Contiades, Eleftheriadis, Kontiades, Manitakis, Marketou and 
Petridis with other notable articles from Alivizatos, Chrysogonos, Drosos, 
Eleftheriadis, Fessas, Papadopoulou and Tassopulos. Many of these individuals are 
all experts in their respective fields while others professionals concerned with the 
democracy of the Greek constitution. Nevertheless, their views are all guided by 
interpreting the Greek constitution over the years and more importantly, 
interpreting its amendments post-1974 and what impact this has had on the 
governance of the country. As their backgrounds vary, so do their audiences, with 
academics targeting the broader academic world, while professionals such as 
lawyers targeting experts in their field regarding the legality of certain articles in the 
constitution under the framework of Eu and international law. As the Economic 
Crisis looms, the majority of these writers agree that the Greek Constitution is in 
need of reform or to be re-written completely, and as such, these views are 
increasing in this area. As a result, articles have increased abundantly since 2009 to 
the present which is added throughout the thesis. 
 
Citizenship 
6 
 
In regards to the institution of Citizenship, the thesis mainly refers to definitions of 
a ‘Greek’ in consecutive Greek Constitutions though the main area of analysis was 
on the Greek Citizenship Code 1975-2015. As with its predecessors, the authors are 
educated Greeks involved in Greek politics. While affiliations are not direct, a 
historical pattern can be seen with those who have defined Greek Citizenship in an 
indirect manner so that it benefited the majority Greek Nation as opposed to non-
Greeks or foreigners as they have been labelled. As can be expected, the Greek 
Nation has again been the main target or focus in accordance with the principles of 
a Nation-State, a topic that is still debated in both Greece and outside the country. 
My use in the thesis has been primarily with definitions of who is considered a 
Greek Citizen based on the literature and what characteristics determined such a 
result. These definitions correlate with each Greek Constitution that was written 
and more so with the Greek Nationality Code 1975 to the present. The most 
effective secondary sources on the institution of Citizenship are those articles 
written by Anagnostou and Christopoulos, respectfully, with other notable 
mentions, however, include articles by Andreouli, Figgou, Kadianaki, Konsta, 
Lazaridis, Sitaropoulos and Zachos. Both of the above-mentioned academics can be 
described as experts in this area, having researched the subject for years 
demonstrated in their abundance of articles on topics pertaining to citizenship. 
After careful analysis, it is evident their views are strictly interpretive of various 
documents pertaining to Greek citizenship such as the Greek Nationality Code on 
behalf of the European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship which is 
intended to promote the democratisation of citizenship laws throughout Europe. 
Their intended audience, then, is any academic, professional or student concerned 
with the writing, implementation and functioning of Greek citizenship laws and how 
this impacts both ethnic Greeks and non-Greeks, respectively. A simple Google 
Scholar search or any search conducted on a university library website will 
demonstrate that the articles written by these academics are highly regarded in the 
academic world through their constant use and peer review. These articles have 
mainly been written in the post-Economic Years where citizenship in Greece has 
been the center of attention as a result of its increasing migrant population from 
the Third World and how such individuals should be dealt with under the EU 
framework.  
 
Popular Sovereignty 
In regards to the institution of Popular Sovereignty, the thesis mainly refers to 
primary sources in the form of official statistics from the Greek Ministry of Interior 
on Greek Elections and Referendums that proved very successful throughout the 
thesis. The authors of such statistics are experienced public servants of the Greek 
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Ministry of Interior qualified in data collection and dissemination of which such 
information is abundantly used by academics when referring to the Greek 
Elections. While election rigging has occurred in Greek history prior to 1975, it is 
one problem that has been phased out from successive elections and as such, 
mechanisms have been put in place through the Greek electoral system to ensure 
those responsible for these statistics cannot be influenced to alter data and present 
their findings without bias and more importantly, political affiliation. The audience 
of such statistics is mainly Greek citizens concerned with who will now be in 
government, as well as both researchers and professionals studying the area. The 
use of these statistics has been properly included as a means of analysing popular 
sovereignty and is supported across the board in the academic world as it is data 
that cannot be manipulated and only studied for what it is. Elections have taken 
place in Greece since 1843, however, the major focus has been on Greek Elections 
and Referendums since 1974 with a particular interest from the academic world 
now in focus after the ignored Greek Referendum 2015. The most important 
secondary sources on the institution of Popular Sovereignty are the articles by 
Dimitras, Dinas, Gemensis and Kassimeris with other notable scholars including 
Tsitouras, Danopoulos, Lyrintzis and Tsitouras. Such individuals can be described as 
experts in their field due to their academic backgrounds as well as, and more 
importantly in my opinion, due to some of their participation in Greek Elections. It is 
important here to note that all of these scholars are firm believers in democracy, 
and as the very word means the ‘people’s rule’, such articles used throughout the 
thesis are vehement in advocating this position as well as outlining how time and 
time again, the popular sovereignty of Greek citizens has been used for alternative 
motives by those who lead. As can be expected, their audience is a variety of 
individuals from various backgrounds, though world mentioning is the European 
audience, ie the EU as a means of gaining support for outside assistance at reform, 
as well as to the Greek citizen to inform them of the misdeeds of politicians. These 
academics are renowned for their work in the academic world, constantly receiving 
support and praise due to the fact that while some may disagree on how popular 
sovereignty should be reformed, there is a shared belief that it must be reformed 
for the benefit of the Greek people. As a result, the publication of these articles are 
varied on their dates, however, many are prevalent in post-elections or post-
referendums held, such as after the Greek Referendum 2015 that was not 
respected by Prime Minister Tsipras. 
 
Political Parties 
In regards to the institution of Political Parties, the thesis mainly refers to primary 
sources primary in the form of Party Programmes as well as sources provided by the 
8 
 
Hellenic Parliament on MPs. The authors of this information have included, since 
the establishment of the Greek State, leaders of these political parties such as 
Karamanlis, Papandreou, to name a few. As leaders, such individuals have strong 
affiliations with their respective parties such as the ND and PASOK, and so on, and 
maintain policies in accordance with its mandate. The indented audience of the 
Party Programmes can be described as twofold with, on the one hand, the Greek 
Nation who they are trying to gain votes from, and on the other hand, party 
members who they want support from. In any works dedicated to political parties, 
these programmes are used by substantially by the world of academia as I have 
done throughout the thesis. While political parties advocate their policies all year 
round, official Party Programmes have usually been released during the election 
period. The secondary sources on the institution of Political Parties most prominent 
in this area are the articles by Arvanitopoulos, Bantimaroudis, Bistis, Gemensis, 
Nestoras and Stavrakakis, with other prominent academics including Botsiou, 
Christopoulos, Dinas, Mochonas, Pappas and Sourdalakis. These individuals are 
mainly academics in Greece or Europe with respected positions as well as 
professionals in Greece such as journalists. Their work is regarded as significantly 
high throughout the academic world due to the fact that they demonstrate the 
various ongoing problems that political parties face, such as the leader complex, 
nepotism and corruption, as well as what reforms are necessary such as 
introducing a party constitution. Depending on their political affiliations, it is 
evident that half wish to advocate their positions to the Greek Laos and the other 
half wish to advocate their positions to the Greek Ethnos. Despite this difference in 
identity, there is an agreement within much of the academic literature and amongst 
scholars, demonstrated in further works, that political parties are there to 
represent all Greek citizens. These articles are growing in importance, particularly 
with the failed SYRIZA Government that promised so much yet delivered so little 
due to becoming absorbed by the very same ailments it rallied against pre-election 
victory. 
 
Government 
In regards to the institution of the Government, the thesis mainly refers to primary 
sources in the form of information from the Greek General Secretariat of the 
Government on Greek Governments, as well as the official Government Gazette. 
The authors of this information were again experienced public servants of the 
General Secretariat of the Government qualified in providing imperative 
information on successive Greek Governments that is continuously used by 
academics. However, it is evident that as this information comes from the Greek 
Government directly, there have been significant cases of bias whereby information 
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is written by party sympathisers or even members of ND, PASOK, to name a few. 
Nevertheless, the audience of this information is for a variety of individuals and 
groups concerned with details of Greek Governments including dates in office, 
members of the cabinet, and so forth. Such sources have allowed me to 
successfully analyse each Greek Government in my given chapters using factual 
information. While Greek Governments are abundant, the major focus here has 
again been on those since 1974 under ND, PASOK, the current SYRIZA-ANEL and all 
those in-between in the forms of Caretaker Governments. The most effective 
secondary sources on the institution of the Government are the articles written by 
Featherstone with other notable works including those articles by Fouskas, 
Papadimitriou and Pappas. Featherstone has long been an expert in Greek politics 
which is reflected in his current position as Professor of Greek at the LSE, his years 
of experience in this field and abundance of academic works that are countlessly 
used by other academics. A key theme running throughout Featherstone’s articles 
is the way in which he presents his articles, namely in simple English with factual 
information from respectable sources. While his works are for all academics and 
professionals to use, I believe the audience of Featherstone’s articles is more 
directed at postgraduate students who are trying to find a sense of truth, honesty 
and purpose regarding the labyrinth that is Greek politics. This is evident in the fact 
that numerous students, including myself throughout the thesis, refer to 
Featherstone’s works as well as his older peers who give nothing but positive peer 
reviews. Such articles do not have a beginning or and end date has Featherstone 
has researched Greek politics for many, many years and as such, maintains the 
reputation of a leading scholar in this area producing works at countless intervals. 
 
Checks and Balances 
In regards to the institution of Checks and Balances, the thesis mainly refers to 
primary sources such as excerpts from successive Greek Constitutions and sessions 
of the Hellenic Parliament. Since the establishment of the Greek State, the authors 
of any primary sources on this institution have been those in power, whether as 
King, Prime Minister, President, an MP, and so on. The primary sources they 
present on this topic have been very limited namely due to their affiliations with 
maintaining political power over the country and people. As such, their intended 
audience can be described as no one in that, in matters pertaining to checks and 
balances, such individuals wish to use the Greek State to their advantage or to fulfil 
personal interests in total secrecy. A simple yet important example is an article 
within the Greek Constitution stating that no MP can be subject to criminal charges 
which continues to be ridiculed due to the lack of checks and balances in the 
country. In addition to these articles in the Constitution and statements (without 
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any action) made in the Hellenic Parliament, primary sources relating to this 
institution are scarce. Unfortunately, as was the case with primary sources, the 
secondary sources on the institution of Checks and Balances is somewhat scarce, 
however, some important articles are by Kalyvas, Konstantinidis, Pappas and 
Mylonas, with others, to a lesser degree, include articles by Grigoriadis, Kaloudis, 
Mavrogordatos, Matsas, Polyzoides and Trantidis. Their backgrounds are also 
varied, though the majority are either academics who work for respected 
universities or professionals in the private sector such as Think Tanks. What is 
important, however, is their advocacy in these articles that checks and balances are 
virtually non-existent in Greece as well as their call for serious reform to be 
conducted. For the majority, their audience is to the Greek political elite itself, an 
audience which proves difficult as this group have avoided serious checks and 
balances and any sense of reform. It is such a view that is shared by these authors 
across the board that despite the current predicament, the area is very much open 
to discussion within the academic world. It is also evident that as Greece continues 
its negotiations with the EU, particularly due to the Economic Crisis, political reform 
will follow its economic reform, albeit slowly, and such an area will hopefully begin 
to flourish in the future with further publications. 
 
Public Sector 
In regards to the institution of the Public Sector, the thesis mainly refers to primary 
sources found in the Greek Constitution, Government Gazette, Presidential 
Decrees, Parliament Sessions and Greek Law. The majority of these authors are 
individuals part of the Greek Government who, despite their backgrounds, 
education or qualifications, are all experts in the practice of clientelism, nepotism, 
corruption, to name a few. As such, the primary sources regarding the Public Sector 
are written and put in place by individuals with a strong bias toward maintaining 
the status quo, that is, gaining a position within the public sector (including 
substantial benefits) in exchange for continuing to vote to those who put them 
there. The audience, then, is directed straight at the Greek Nation. The evidence of 
this is abundant throughout Greek society regarding any kind of government 
service whereby everyday Greeks will have to pay a fakelaki or bride in order to 
receive the promised service, with many others flowing throughout the thesis. As 
these are case by case examples, all such sources vary in their date of publication 
but have come to light even more so with the ongoing Economic Crisis and call for 
reform. The most prevalent secondary sources on the institution of the Public 
Sector cane be described as the articles by Angelaki with other notable writers 
including Christos, Pagoulatos, Kalaitzidis and Kouvelakis. Angelaki is a respected 
academic of Panteion University that has written substantial works on Greek 
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society, namely employment regarding both the public and private sectors. In her 
works throughout the thesis, Angelaki clearly identifies the balloon that is the Greek 
public sector, the constant clientelism that runs deep within it, as well as reforms 
that are needed. Her intended audience is the everyday Greek citizen in an effort to 
help them understand what while they did not create the problems, their fate will 
be much worse if they do not complete reforms, which comes to her second 
audience of the EU. While many academics have argued against Angelaki, it is 
evident after reading much of her literature as well as those from the mentioned 
writers above that the Greek public sector is a problem in Greece, a position shared 
by many Greeks and the EU, and that it requires change. As a result of the 
Economic Crisis, many such articles have been written as to how it can be resolved, 
including the problems within the public sector, which has led to its increase in 
research, discussion and debate within the academic world and political realm. 
 
Security 
In regards to the institution of Security, the thesis mainly refers to primary sources 
also found in the Greek Constitution, Government Gazette, Presidential Decrees, 
Parliament Sessions and Greek Law. Here, the authors are educated and qualified 
individuals part of the Greek State, namely relating to matters of defence, foreign 
policy and policing. Throughout Greek history, this area has been the focus of those 
with a right-wing ideology and as such, the authors are heavily affiliated with the 
Hellenic Armed Forces, Hellenic Police, National Intelligence Service, Hellenic 
Ministry of Defence and Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their audience has, 
since the time of the Greek Revolution, been solely for the Greek Nation and Greek 
State, who they believe they are responsible for in terms of protection and 
continuity. This has been touched upon heavily throughout the thesis and is an 
area whereby the literature is abundantly discussed, particularly due to Greece’s 
internal political divisions. Depending on the point in time, these sources vary in 
their publication but are usually present during times of conflict, war and increased 
tension. Some of the most effective secondary sources on the institution of Security 
are articles by Danopoulos, Frangoudaki, Karakatsanis, Kassimeris, Kazamias, 
Koundouras, Rizas, Veremis, to name but a few who have conducted research in 
this prominent and important area. All can be considered experts in their field, 
which, in terms of security, ranges from experts in the Greece’s Armed Forces and 
Police to experts in its relations with Albania, the FYR and Turkey regarding ongoing 
issues. As a result, their views all differ, with some focusing on security and its 
influence on Greek politics which has been an ongoing issue, particularly with right-
wing parties, while others focus more so on Greece’s relations and resolving 
national issues with neighbours. The audience of these articles depends largely on 
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who is reading them and why, but the majority seek to engage with academics and 
even politicians involved in the security apparatus. Due to the large amount of 
literature in this area, there are many authors who write in accordance with their 
own political beliefs and as such, I specifically chose academics who write from a 
centrist perspective to avoid bias which, as I can see, is not included in these 
articles. As such, these articles have been written for a long time, since the 
establishment of the Greek Nation-State, with a peak post-1974 until today and 
even more so now with Greece’s first leftist SYRIZA Government that strategically 
placed far right individuals to positions of importance such as the Ministry of 
Defence. 
 
Elites 
In regards to the institution of Elites, the thesis mainly refers to primary sources by 
such individuals themselves in their official biographies or memoirs. It cannot be 
denied that these individuals all come from wealthy, prominent and educated 
families, whether belonging to the Karamanlis or Papandreou Dynasties and as 
such, have a substantial amount of expertise in their personal and family histories. 
While any form of bias has not been found in these biographies, what is evident in 
all is the sheer amount of dedication that these individuals have toward their 
families or political dynasties that are also influenced by regional affiliations or 
clans. The audience for these biographies or memoirs is largely the Greek Nation, 
both in Greece and the Diaspora, in an attempt to educate the Greeks on such 
families. However, another common theme seen throughout these biographies is a 
sense of neglect at discussing certain issues relating to these families that the 
Greeks would and should know of, a reason why individuals with an elite status are 
studied more so by academics as well as in this thesis. To date, most elites have 
written their biographies and memoirs in their post-Prime Minister, President or 
MP years and as such, specific dates vary. The best secondary source available on 
the institution of Elites is that by Sotiropoulos on Ministerial Elites with other 
prominent works on specific areas by Doukas, Karakatsanis, Manolopoulos and 
Teperoglou. Sotiropoulos is considered an expert in this area as not only is he an 
Associate Professor of Political Science (including Greece) at the UA but lives in 
Athens, experiencing Greek politics first hand. Sotiropoulos’ article on Ministerial 
Elites is clear that it is written from a perspective without bias with a view that seeks 
to expose the degree of elites within the Greek political spectrum from as early as 
the 1800s or since the establishment of the Greek Nation-State. With such works, 
the audience is for both academics and professionals, though governments also 
seem to be of focus, namely those in Europe. While this article has been successful 
through its use by many other academics in their writings, its sole downfall is the 
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fact that it is one if not the only article of its kind that discusses Greek elites in such 
detail. Nevertheless, Sotiropoulos continues to add to this article and in this area 
which has fuelled research by other academics with the same purpose, including 
this thesis. 
 
Church of Greece 
In regards to the institution of the Church of Greece, the thesis mainly the thesis 
mainly refers to primary sources such as the Anathema against Greek Revolutionaries 
1821 or Canon Law and documents such as various press releases, all originals 
belonging to the Church. The majority of these documents have been written by the 
clergy of the Church of Greece with an education and qualification in Orthodoxy, 
their sole area of expertise whether administration or theology and are regularly 
cited by academics. While these documents are primary sources, all of the authors 
have an affiliation with the Church of Greece and as such, their work has been 
written from with an Orthodox view in mind, at times demonstrating bias, with the 
purpose of advocating matters pertaining to the Orthodox World. The majority of 
these documents are aimed at the Greek Nation and more importantly, Christian 
Greeks who comprise a majority in Greece without concern for others. It is this 
position that has led to many academics researching the influence of the Church of 
Greece on the Greek State which is demonstrated in the sources used and 
referenced throughout the thesis. The majority of these sources have been written 
from 1821 right up until the present, and are continuously being studied further. 
Some of the most efficient secondary sources available on the institution of the 
Church of Greece are the articles written by Halikiopoulou and Papastathis with 
notable mentions of the articles by Diamantopoulou, Karagiannis, Koutras, 
Kyriazopoulos, Makrides, Molokotos and Vallianatos. Halikiopoulou and Papastathis 
are both experts in this field, both holding prominent positions in Europe’s top 
universities. After reading their extended works, it is evident that the former seeks 
to explain the relationship between the Greek State and the Church while the latter 
seeks to examine the role of the Church in Greek politics, both from academic 
points of view. As with all secondary sources covered, their audience is both the 
academic and professional world, though one does feel an indirect audience of 
these articles is the Church itself whose own clergy have, at times, written in 
contrast to such accusations. As was the case with Elites, due to its infiltration 
within the Greek State, evidence is limited, however, both these authors and others 
mentioned have succeeded in their purpose. As the years progress and as Greece 
becomes more democratic, more research has been conducted in this area with the 
latest by Papastathis on the Church and Right Wing Political Parties bringing factual 
light to this ongoing and at times, bizarre relationship. 
14 
 
Methodology 
 
According to Samuel Huntington, an institution is defined as a "stable, valued and 
recurring pattern of behaviour" and that in terms of the state, these are best 
identified by their level of adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence.1 
Through this definition, I followed selection criteria that allowed me to identify the 
specific institutions of a political system which would only be included in the thesis. 
In the case of Greece, I solely chose the institutions that have been embedded in 
the functioning of the Greek Nation-State since its establishment in 1821. It is for 
this reason that other sub-institutions have been excluded, for example, the 
economy, as they are, in effect, controlled by larger institutions. 
The institutions that I refer to are analysed through a historical interpretation 
and reconstruction to determine how they have existed and evolved in Greece with 
a specific focus over the last 41 years. Such a task was conducted through the 
reading of numerous primary sources such as the Greek Constitution and 
secondary sources by historical writers such as Thanos M. Veremis, Thomas W. 
Gallant and Richard Clogg. In each period explored, I was able to determine which 
institutions in Greece can be described as its foundations such as the Greek 
Constitution, which can be described as belonging to the state-apparatus such as 
the Greek Government and which belong to the quasi-state apparatus such as the 
Church of Greece. Furthermore, I effectively identified the institutions’ continuities 
and discontinuities, functions and dysfunctions, and successes and failures. 
The institutions that I refer to are therefore presented using an approach that 
focuses on its respective theoretical and practical parameters, and final evaluation. 
In all periods explored, I follow a pattern that presents my findings based on what 
was said in theory, usually by a Greek Government, what they, however, did in 
practice, and finally, what the result was of this action. Such a strategy was 
imperative for this thesis question as it allowed me to effectively analyse each 
particular institution of the Greek Nation-State and its relation to Greek democracy. 
Through my research, I feel that I was able to both contribute to this very important 
area of study while also setting the foundations for further research to be 
conducted in the future. 
  
                                                            
1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Clinton, The Colonial Press, 1968, p. 450 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question, what are the successes and 
failures of democracy and its institutions in post-1975 Greece? In order for this to be 
achieved, the thesis will analyse and address the successes and failures of the 
democratic institutions in Greece most important to the functioning of the Greek 
Nation-State. These institutions are the constitution, citizenship, popular 
sovereignty, political parties, government, checks and balances, public sector, 
security, elites and finally, the Church of Greece. The analysis will be conducted 
from a diachronic perspective or the ways in which these institutions have evolved 
and developed as well as in accordance with historical contextualisation or how 
these institutions are understood as a result of their context in specific historical 
settings. 
More specifically, these institutions will be examined briefly from the years 
1821-1974 and then in detail over the last 41 years from 1975 until today that will 
be outlined in six specific chapters in accordance with the Greek State’s 
constitutional amendments. Chapter 1 will, therefore, cover the period from 1821 – 
1974, the year the Greek Nation-State was established to the end of the 
Papadopoulos Junta, and will demonstrate the extent to which these institutions 
have embedded themselves in the Greek Constitution thirteen times. Chapter 2 will 
cover the period from 1975 - 1985, the year the Greek Constitution 1975 was 
implemented until before its first amendment and will analyse these institutions 
under the New Democracy (ND) Government of Konstantinos Karamanlis and later, 
the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) Government of Andreas Papandreou. 
Chapter 3 will cover the period from 1986 – 2000, the year the Greek Constitution 
was first amended until before its second amendment and will analyse these 
institutions under the PASOK Governments of Papandreou, Costas Simitis and later 
ND Government of Konstantinos Mitsotakis. 
Chapter 4 will cover the period from 2001 – 2007, the year the Greek 
Constitution was secondly amended until before its third amendment and will 
analyse these institutions under the PASOK Government of Simitis though mainly 
under the ND Government of Kostas Karamanlis. Chapter 5 will cover the period 
2008 – 2016, the year the Greek Constitution was amended for the third time and 
will analyse these institutions under the ND Government of Kostas Karamanlis 
though mainly the PASOK Government of George Papandreou, ND Government of 
Antonis Samaras and current SYRIZA-ANEL Government of Alexis Tsipras. Finally, 
Chapter 6 will cover the future of Greece where I will offer an insight as to how 
these institutions can evolve toward a more democratic Greece. However, it should 
be noted that due to the thesis word count of a Master of Arts and the significant 
16 
 
period covered, I was limited in offering an in-depth analysis of these institutions 
and as a result, chose to give a brief outline of their successes and failure that I am 
confident is successful at adding something new to Hellenic Studies. 
 
  
17 
 
Chapter 1: 1821 – 1974 
 
1. Political History of Greece 
In order to understand the complexities of this thesis, it is imperative that the 
political history of the Greek nation-state be outlined. In March of 1821, after 368 
years of the Tourkokratia or Rule of the Turks, the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire 
begun the Greek Revolution that subsequently led to the First Hellenic Republic 
1822-1832.2 When the Great Powers of the time recognized the new Greek nation-
state, they helped establish the Kingdom of Greece in 1832 under King Otto, an 
absolute monarchy that was changed to a constitutional monarchy in 1843 due to 
the Greek dissatisfaction with what they regarded as the Bavarokratia or Rule of the 
Bavarians.3 However, still displeased with Otto, the Greeks had him ousted in 1864 
and replaced with King George I who changed the Kingdom of Greece to a 
parliamentary monarchy, a system that was not without its own challenges, namely 
the National Schism between those who favoured the parliamentary monarchy and 
those who wanted a parliamentary republic.4 Although those who favoured the 
latter were victorious and established the Second Hellenic Republic in 1924, the 
National Schism continued to be a never-ending battle that strained domestic 
politics and in 1935, the Kingdom of Greece was restored as a parliamentary 
monarchy.5 
However, a year later in 1936, the National Schism was of little significance 
with General Ioannis Metaxas establishing a monarchical dictatorship that lasted 
until Greece’s involvement in World War II (WWII) and subsequent Axis Occupation.6 
Occupied Greece was administered mainly in the cities and towns by the Hellenic 
State or established collaborationist government under the Axis Powers, in the 
mountains and countryside by the National Liberation Front (EAM) and Greek 
People's Liberation Army (ELAS), and finally, without any official jurisdiction, by the 
Greek government-in-exile that later returned after WWII and was victorious in the 
Greek Civil War 1945-1949.7 In its aftermath and with the support of the Allies, the 
Kingdom of Greece was restored as a parliamentary monarchy until April 21, 1967, 
when Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos and later Brigadier General Dimitrios 
                                                            
2 J. S. Koliopoulos and T. M. Veremis, Modern Greece: A History Since 1821, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010, p. 15 
3 C. G. Thomas, Greece: A Short History of a Long Story, Oxford, John Wiley and Sons, 2014, pp. 153-157 
4 R. Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 30-35 
5 C.M. Woodhouse, Modern Greece: A Short History, London, Faber and Faber, 2000, Chapter 2 
6 Koliopoulos and Veremis, Modern Greece, p. 103-104 
7 Thomas, Greece: A Short History of a Long Story, pp. 168-170 
18 
 
Ioannidis established the Greek Junta.8 On July 15, 1974, the Junta was responsible 
for the coup d'état in Cyprus that ousted President Makarios III and replaced him 
with Nikos Sampson.9 
In an effort to support and protect the Greeks who comprised the majority of 
Cyprus, the Junta and Sampson attempted Enosis or Union of with Greece. Days 
later, in an effort to protect the Turkish minority, Turkey responded with the 
Turkish Invasion of Cyprus that resulted in occupation, displacements, missing 
persons and mass casualties. As a result of what had happened, prominent military 
officers withdrew their support for the Junta and on July 24, it collapsed.10 A few 
months later, the Metapolitefsi or Regime Change was established in 1974. 
 
2. Formation of the Greek Nation-State 
The formation of the Greek nation-state begun with the Greek Revolution 1821-
1832.11 Inspired by the Greek Enlightenment 1700-1821 whereby prominent Greeks 
of the Diaspora such as Adamantios Korais and Rigas Feraios expressed the ideas 
of freedom, democracy and rights, the three Greeks Emmanuil Xanthos, Nikolaos 
Skouphas and Athanasios Tsakalov founded the Filiki Etaireia or Friendly Society that 
from 1814-1821 organised the Greek Revolution against the Turks.12 Tradition holds 
that on March 25, 1821, Germanos III of Patras raised the Greek flag in the Church 
of Agia Lavra amongst Greek Revolutionaries and proclaimed Greek 
independence.13 Despite this tradition, similar events had taken place prior to this 
event by Greek Revolutionaries such as with Alexander Ypsilantis and his Sacred 
Band who in February of 1821 started a revolt against the Turks in what is now 
modern-day Romania.14 
Nevertheless, on May 26, 1821, Greek Revolutionaries officially announced 
their proclamation of independence at the Messinian Senate.15 The will of Greek 
Revolutionaries and Greeks overall is best exemplified in the words of Feraios who 
said in 1797 “it's finer to live one hour as a free man than forty years as a slave and 
prisoner”. Such a statement demonstrated that the Greeks would rather achieve 
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their freedom and die after only an hour rather than live under the Rule of the Turks 
any longer.16 However, although most Greeks believed in the establishment of an 
independent Greek nation-state, there was no universal consensus as to the form it 
would take.17 While many attempts were made toward the model of the Greek 
nation-state, there was a significant amount of differences and even open conflict 
between the politicians and the military.18 
In 1827, with the assistance of the then Great Powers Russia, France and 
Great Britain, the Greeks agreed to the appointment of Ioannis Kapodistrias to be 
the Governor of Greece.19 Kapodistrias, an educated Greek of the Diaspora who 
had formally served as the Minister of the Septinsular Republic and in the Russian 
Foreign Service, was the most prominent man for the job due to both experience 
and neutrality.20 He carefully used his diplomatic skills and officially declared the 
independence of Greece from the Ottoman Empire, established and built the 
nation-state from scratch and gained the recognition and protection of the Great 
Powers.21 After years of struggle, the Greek nation-state had finally been 
established.22 
 
3. Constitutions 
The first Greek Constitution of 1822, influenced by the French Model, was drafted 
by 59 self-appointed Greek representatives and comprised of 110 articles that dealt 
with the organisation of the state, namely the legislative, executive of 5 members of 
Head of State and a Supreme Court of 11 members equally elected by the 
legislative and executive.23 The Constitution of 1823 was similar to its predecessor 
and only different in that it strengthened the role of the legislative, reinforced 
fundamental rights and introduced the provision that the constitution takes 
precedence over all legislation.24 The Constitution of 1827, which appointed Ioannis 
Kapodistrias as Governor of Greece, introduced the concept of a unitary state, the 
principle of national sovereignty, three-year terms in the legislative, an independent 
judiciary, and the granting of total power to Kapodistrias over the executive.25 
Although the Constitution of 1844 introduced certain rights, it was drafted so King 
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Otto could retain the throne and still granted him power over the executive, 
appointing Senators to the Upper House and judges to the judiciary, with no 
provision for future revisions.26 
The Constitution of 1864 can be described as the first that was democratic 
and a model for all successor constitutions that introduced a parliamentary 
monarchy, restricted the powers of the king, enlarged the rights of citizens and 
most importantly, was based on the principle of popular sovereignty.27 For 
example, Articles 29-44 significantly expanded on the separation of powers with a 
fully independent judiciary and for the first time, ceased the operation of the 
senate by introducing a single parliament, and a provision that allowed future 
revisions to be made.28 The Constitution of 1911 was interesting in that it mainly 
focused on the judiciary by increasing its independence from the legislative and 
executive, setting up a court that would replace the parliament in verifying election 
results, laws that protected the rights of citizens and laws that simplified matters 
relating to legislation.29 The Constitution of 1927 granted the legislative the power 
to revise the constitution, revise laws and dissolve parliament; granted the 
executive the power to elect the parliament and senate; and finally, granted the 
legislative the power to review constitutional laws, establish a Supreme 
Administrative Court for the decentralisation of power and power to enforce social 
rights.30  
The Constitution of 1948 replicated the Constitution of 1911 with the only 
difference being the inclusion of the Parasyntagma or Para-Constitution, a large list 
of acts and decrees contrary to a democracy including the powers to erase 
citizenship and nationality, deport leftists, confiscate property, and much more.31 
The Constitution of 1952 was also a replica of the Constitutions of 1864 and 1911, 
re-establishing a parliamentary monarchy with the separation of powers, granting 
the King with considerable legislative powers and lacked certain rights of citizens 
with the exception being the right to vote for women.32 The Constitution of 1968 
retained the previously established parliamentary monarchy with the King as its 
head while including a provision that suspended the rights of citizens, the most 
important being universal suffrage33 where a few years later, the Constitution of 
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1973 was introduced and changed the type of government to a parliamentary 
democracy, replacing the King with the President.34 
 
4. Citizenship 
The question ‘Who is a Greek?’ or rather, who would be the citizens of the Greek 
nation-state began with the Greek Revolutionaries who decided in the Constitution 
of 1822 that all the native inhabitants of Greek territory who believed in Christ were 
Greeks.35 The following year in 1823, in addition to the previous definition of who 
was a Greek, an individual was also considered Greek if they appeared in front of 
the Greek authorities and declared themselves a foreigner who spoke Greek and 
wanted to believe in Christ.36 Further additions were made to the definition in 1827 
whereby an individual was considered Greek if they believed in Christ but still lived 
under the Rule of the Turks, was born to a Greek father or swore an oath of 
allegiance to Greece.37 Although in 1844 attempts were made to replace such 
revisions with liberal notions of citizenship, a clear distinction had been enforced 
between ethnic Greeks with citizenship or autochthonous Greeks and ethnic Greeks 
without citizenship or heterochthonous Greeks.38 
However, this definition was misleading as it did not specify which native 
inhabitants, Greek lands or Christian denominations it was referring to.39 The 
intention of the Greek Revolutionaries with the first addition was to ensure all 
ethnic Greeks felt part of the Greek nation-state while showing gratitude to 
Philhellenes who helped their cause.40 The third addition to the definition of who 
was a Greek was an attempt to make a distinction between ethnic Greeks who were 
citizens of Greece and overall part of the ethnos or nation and ethnic Greeks outside 
of Greece who were not citizens and overall part of the overall genos or race.41 While 
the intention of the final addition was to identify all Greeks as part of the Greek 
ethnos, it caused much friction between the natives or autochthonous Greeks with 
those outside Greek territory or heterochthonous Greeks and ultimately, an 
ongoing conflict between Greeks from Old Greece and New Greece.4243 
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Despite efforts to unite the Greeks, autochthonous Greeks of the original 
Kingdom of Greece often considered the heterochthonous Greeks as a burden on 
Greek society, particularly when its borders increased throughout the years of the 
Megali Idea or Great Idea. The tension became so heated that autochthonous 
Greeks often labelled the heterochthonous Greeks as foreigners and Tourkosporoi 
or Turkish seeds.44 When the autochthonous Greeks eventually considered the 
heterochthonous Greeks as Greeks in their own right, they still did not allow them 
to be granted Greek citizenship for some time.45 Once Greek citizenship had been 
granted to the heterochthonous Greeks, they endured another form of 
discrimination by the autochthonous Greeks whereby the latter of the original 
Kingdom of Greece were able to work in the public sector, guaranteeing power to 
the original Greeks.46  
 
5. Popular Sovereignty 
Although the nation-state was established in 1822 with the First Hellenic Republic, 
decisions were whole-heartedly made by Ioannis Kapodistrias and later by King 
Otto until he was forced to introduce universal suffrage or the right to vote for men 
only in 1844.47 When King Otto was dethroned and replaced by King George in 
1864, Charilaos Trikoupis, a prominent liberal who was Prime Minister five times 
from 1875-1895, significantly helped enforce the proper functioning of popular 
sovereignty by introducing numerous reforms in the country that benefitted 
citizens.48 Eleutherios Venizelos, another prominent liberal who was Prime Minister 
eight times from 1910-1935, vehemently respected and upheld the idea of popular 
sovereignty and also introduced numerous political, economic and social policies of 
modernization for the benefit of all citizens.49 In 1952, the right to vote was 
extended to women, allowing for a new voice to be heard by leaders of the time 
such as Karamanlis who sought to rebuild the country with the people’s mandate.50 
Despite introducing universal suffrage, King Otto reverted to his old ways by 
disrupting elections and intervening in parliament, thus violating his initial 
agreement.51 His replacement King George I followed suit by making it difficult for 
Trikoupis to establish strong democratic institutions by undermining their 
                                                            
44 A. Regos, The 2nd Hellenic Republic 1924-1935, Athens, Themelio, 1999, p. 223-228 
45 Greek Constitution, 1844, Articles 3-13 
46 Greek National Assembly, 1843-1844 
47 Greek Constitution, 1844, Articles 22-30 
48 Greek Constitution, 1864, Articles 54-78 
49 Greek Constitution, 1911, Articles 54-76 
50 Greek Constitution, 1952, Articles 54-75 
51 Greek Constitution, 1844, Articles 31-36 
23 
 
enforcement.52 By interfering in politics, especially in foreign policy, the successor 
of George I, Constantine I caused the National Schism with Venizelos and the 
temporary establishment of the Provisional Government of National Defence.53 
Problems arose once again between Karamanlis and later Papandreou with King 
Paul I ranging from political rigging and fraud, the power to choose ministers for 
the government, authority over the armed forces and even fundraisers held by the 
Palace.54 
The words of Trikoupis bring light to the slow process of popular sovereignty 
when he elegantly asked the rhetorical question “Τις πταίει;” or “"Who is to blame?", 
directly and indirectly blaming the monarchy for the lack of respect for popular 
sovereignty.55 From its insertion, popular sovereignty has fallen victim to the 
personal interferences of individuals who seek to maintain all power, particularly 
during times of the Kingdom of Greece which significantly disrupted the political 
process.56 The result of this interference has had drastic effects on the Greek 
people and Greece itself that has led to moments of instability with resignations of 
prominent Prime Ministers such as Trikoupis and Venizelos. On a greater scale, 
interference has led to moments of crisis and tragedy with notable examples 
including the Asia Minor Catastrophe, Population Exchange and Metaxas Regime. 
 
6. Political Parties 
From 1832-1863, Greece was dominated by the Great Powers who recognised and 
guaranteed the existence of the Greek nation-state through the English Party that 
was pro-England, liberal and led by men such as Alexandros Mavrokordatos, the 
French Party that was pro-France, constitutional and led by men such as Ioannis 
Kolettis and finally, the Russian Party that was pro-Russia, nationalist and led by 
men such as Constantine Kanaris.57 From 1864-1910, a change occurred in the 
country where two factions dominated, the Nationalist Party of Alexandros 
Koumoundouros and later Theodoros Deligiannis which adhered to nationalism, 
conservatism and traditionalism against their rivals in the New Party of Trikoupis 
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that was vehemently liberal.58 The next wave occurred with Venizelos, founder and 
leader of the Liberal Party with strict principles of liberalism, republicanism and 
modernisation that later become known as Venizelism against individuals in the 
People’s Party of Dimitrios Gounaris who were anti-Venizelists, pro-monarchists, 
strict conservatives and nationalists.59 Post-Civil War, the two most important 
individuals of the time whose parties would later dominate Greek politics were 
Konstantinos Karamanlis of the conservative National Radical Union against his 
opponent Georgios Papandreou of the socialist Centre Union.60 
Despite the political party that these individuals belong to, the most common 
theme that all possess is the notorious and ongoing Greek personality cult. 
Through this system, political parties are run based solely on the personality and 
choices of their respective leaders.61 In accordance with their own personal 
ideologies, leaders use the charisma, attractiveness and charm of their distinct 
character in order to gain the patronage of fellow parliamentarians within their 
respective parties. Outside of the party and arguably where it counts most, this 
relationship exists with leaders and the Greek population who tend not to vote for 
political parties but rather, the leaders of such parties whose personality has 
individually swayed them the most effectively.62 
Subsequently, the Greek personality ensures that choosing the most 
qualified person to lead a political party, in accordance with its own constitution, is 
ignored. Furthermore, due to the prestige that these leaders receive, there is no 
level of accountability or responsibility for any of their actions. In regards to their 
fellow party members, a special relationship is maintained whereby leaders will 
offer entitlements or positions in exchange for their unconditional support.6364 A 
special relationship is also formed between leaders and citizens whereby the 
former use their political foresight and make countless promises of handouts and 
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other policies that will benefit citizens in exchange for their vote come election 
time.65 
 
7. Government 
In Greece, depending on the period, the government or executive branch of the 
separation of powers has included the King, Prime Minister and Cabinet. The King 
or Prime Minister then chooses his or her fellow parliamentarians to serve in the 
respective ministries of the new government that deal with the daily administration 
of the Greek state, such as the Ministry of Defence. In accordance with the 
constitution, the laws and the platform of the political party that is now in 
government, ministers oversee that their ministry ensures the interests of the 
Greek people are fulfilled. These interests are guided based on both the domestic 
and foreign policies that the government establishes as a guide that helps with its 
decisions and achieving goals throughout their time in office.66 
However, Manolopoulos describes the function of the government as a 
modern day monster, a hydra consisting of several heads. Each of these heads, he 
explains, comprise of the statism, nepotism, cronyism and clientelism embedded in 
Greek society.67 In Greece, all power and influence is projected out from the central 
government or executive part of the government, ensuring everything and anything 
is passed through its administration.68 With each new government, key positions 
ranging from ministers to local mayors are filled with both the immediate and 
external family members from the same village, town, city and region, maintaining 
the dominance of their particular clan. 
In this regard, the only condition for positions of power is having the same 
bloodlines.69 Next on the list, usually lower to those of family members, are the 
friends, contacts and associates who are also put in various positions, regardless of 
their education or experience.70 What holds all this in place is the notion of 
‘something for something’ where those in power make promises of employment, 
status or another benefit in exchange for a vote or bribe.71 By doing so, the 
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government creates a system where the nation serves the state and not the state 
serving the nation. 
 
8. Checks and Balances 
In many of the Greek Constitutions that have been written, the concept of checks 
and balances can be found, to a certain degree, within its articles that deal with the 
separation of powers.72 In the case of Greece, it seems that those who contributed 
to the writing of these articles did not fully understand what was meant by each 
branch of government having a check over the other to ensure the balance of 
power between them.73 This is reflected in the many articles that are unclear and 
do not make any distinction as to how the separation of powers are divided equally, 
causing much confusion for those who try to interpret them.74 Complicating 
matters further, there are those articles that question the notion of checks and 
balances in the system, a primary example being the lack of separation between 
the legislative and executive.75 
In the case of the Greek political system, what can be described as the 
central administration created on paper does not function as intended. In laymen’s 
terms, the Greeks in government ignore what they do not understand, i.e. the 
importance of checks and balances.76 The reason behind the reality of ignoring 
checks and balances is largely due to the fact that most of the Greeks, with the 
exception of those in the Diaspora, lived under the Tourkokratia. As a result, the 
Greeks did not experience the Renaissance and the full extent of the Enlightenment 
when these ideas were embedded in the democratic system.77 
Greeks then tend to work around the official system in accordance with their 
own system they have become accustomed to as a result of almost four hundred 
years under the Turks.78 The very idea of checks and balances remains oblivion to 
the Greeks as such a system allowed the Greeks a certain amount of autonomy 
under various factions with the only condition being loyalty and taxes to the Sultan. 
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When the Greeks gained their freedom, the same factions continued to operate as 
they previous did without any obligations to the Sultan and thus, the importance of 
checks and balances remains at the low end of the spectrum.79 Regardless of who is 
in power, there are no effective mechanisms in place within the Greek nation-state 
that hold individuals responsible for their decisions and accountable for their 
actions.80 
 
9. Public Sector 
The Greek public sector comprises of individuals who are employed by the Greek 
Government to directly carry out the roles and responsibilities of the administration 
of the state in both a civil and military nature.81 As is the case with its ministers, 
each ministry of government employs citizens it deems the most relevant to the 
position.82 As per their terms of employment, public servants abide by the 
guidelines of their profession, overseen by their superiors, and are responsible for 
offering citizens various public services.83 These range from teachers, doctors, 
police officers, judges, diplomats, the post, and numerous others.84 
However, the public sector in Greece functions on an invisible social contract 
between the government and public servants based on clientelism or the exchange 
of favours.85 In exchange for votes, the government offers public servants wage 
increases and other bonuses, tax exemptions, early retirements and pensions 
which are vehemently supported by their unions.86 Furthermore, many public 
servants have followed in the footsteps of the government by extending clientelism 
between themselves and citizens. In this manner, public servants will only offer 
their required public service in exchange for a direct or indirect favour, usually a 
fakelaki or bribe or money. 
The continuation of this contract has created a public sector that is the 
largest and most bloated sector in the country comprised of numerous unqualified 
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and inexperienced public servants.87 By maintaining the status quo, every day 
Greek citizens are left with the option of either paying a bribe to receive their 
service or to seek it elsewhere on the black market.  Furthermore, the purposeful 
overrepresentation and assignment of public servants to the same or similar 
position, sometimes more than one, has decreased levels of productivity with tasks 
that would initially take one individual to complete being divided among many, and 
others being assigned, in name only, to positions that are outdated or simply do 
not exist.88 There have even been cases with public servants spending government 
time on personal use, long breaks and numerous days of absence.89 
 
10. Security 
King Otto established the Gendarmerie in 1833 that was ironically comprised of 
Klephtes or thieves, men who for centuries made a living from breaking the law and 
were now tasked with enforcing it.90 In an effort at modernisation, reforms were 
made in 1920 with the establishment of the Cities Police who were tasked with 
crime primarily in Athens and later other cities as well as in 1946 with the help of 
the British in order to model the Gendarmerie after the British Police and make it 
more civilian friendly.9192 In addition, although de facto established in 1821, the 
Greek Army and Navy were officially established in 1828 and prided themselves as 
the backbone of the Greek nation-state for their role during the Greek Revolution.93 
In 1911, this extended to the Hellenic Air Force which saw its first engagement in 
the Balkan Wars that ultimately ended in a Greek victory. 
However, over the years, both the Hellenic Police and Hellenic Armed Forces 
have been caught up in the affairs of the Greek nation-state due to their perception 
as the protectors of the Greeks and above all, Greece.94 Traditionally, as this idea is 
advocated within right-wing nationalism, which runs deep in the history of Greek 
politics, both the Hellenic Police and Hellenic Armed Forces have easily aligned 
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themselves and given support to such groups.95 The Hellenic Police have therefore 
based law and order on a strict militaristic hierarchy, training and personal bias 
with abuses occurring systematically.96 Additionally, the Greek Army has believed it 
has the authority to ensure that all those it regards as enemies of Greece should be 
dealt with through whatever means necessary.  
The Hellenic Police have thus been brutal towards those considered 
undesirables, leftists or simply a person who was not liked by arresting, detaining 
or exiling them to uninhabited islands without a fair trial and in less fortunate 
cases, torturing, kidnapping and murdering them. On rare but notable occasions, 
the Hellenic Police have been especially brutal such as with the Dilessi Murders in 
1870. On an even greater scale, the Hellenic Army has successfully and 
unsuccessfully intervened in Greek politics in 1843, 1862, 1909, 1922, 1923, 1925, 
1926, 1935, 1938 and 1961.97 While most of these caused considerable damage, the 
most brutal were the Metaxas Regime 1936-1941 and Papadopoulos Junta 1967-
1974.98 
 
11. Elites 
Elites in Greece can be broken down into those who were and are descendants 
from Old Greece or Attica, Peloponnese and Rumelia and include the 
Mavromichalis, Zaimis, Trikoupis, Koumoundouros, Deligeorgis, Deligiannis and 
Papandreou families, to name but a few.99 There are also those who are 
descendants from the Phanar District of Constantinople, otherwise known as the 
Phanariotes and includes the Mavrokordatos and Rallis families, and in unique 
cases those from Crete or Asia Minor such as the Venizelos and Karamanlis 
families. Furthermore, elites have included descendants of the Greek aristocrats 
from the Ionian Islands such as Theotokis and Metaxas families.100 Finally, there are 
those from the Aegean Islands part of the merchant fleet, still the largest in the 
world, and includes the Angelicoussis, Pappas, Frangou, Economou, Livanos, 
                                                            
95 D. Christopoulos, “Mapping Ultra-Right Extremism, Xenophobia and Racism within the Greek State 
Apparatus”, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2014, p. 39 
96 M. Mazower, The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives, Oxford, 
Berghahn Books, 1997, pp. 134-142 
97 C. P. Danopoulos and C. A. Watson, The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook, 
London, Greenwood Press, 1996, pp. 154-168 
98 T. Veremis, Military in Greek Politics, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1997, pp. 183-188 
99 D. Keridis, Historical Dictionary of Modern Greece, Plymouth, The Scarecrow Press, 2009, pp. 179-
184 
100 A. Triandafyllidou, R. Gropas and H. Kouki, The Greek Crisis and European Modernity, Bassingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p.90-97 
30 
 
Prokopiou, Veniamis, Konstantakopoulos, Tsakos, Marinakis, Palios, Georgiopoulos, 
Platsidakis and Melissanidis, Kanaris, Voulgaris, families.101 
In the case of Greece, such elites can be described as adhering to what 
Sotiropoulos and Bourikos describe as the ‘iron law of oligarchy’. Regardless of how 
democratic Greece may perceive itself to be, the existence of such individuals has 
inevitably lead to the development of oligarchic tendencies.102 It would seem that 
most, if not all of these Greek elites, whether by lineage or associate, have 
infiltrated and created a power vacuum within the core of the country.103 More 
specifically, using the Greek nation-state as their tool, Greek elites have ensured 
their power and influence flows down in a hierarchical system throughout Greek 
society.104 
All political positions within the country such as the President, Prime Minister 
and Ministers have nevertheless been filled by descendants of such families. 
Through whatever means necessary, including extremely high levels of corruption, 
special concessions and the like, and at the expense of the majority of the Greeks, 
Greek elites maintain this status quo to fulfil their own collective and mainly 
monetary interests.105 This is demonstrated in the fact that the core economic 
sectors of the country ranging from banking, shipping, petroleum, mining, steel, art 
collection and other commodities are dominated solely by Greek elites such as the 
Niarchos, Latsis, Mistakidis and Angelopoulos families.106 In total, Greek elites who 
represent approximately one percent of all Greeks in Greece control approximately 
sixty percent of the total wealth in the country, totaling in the hundreds of billions 
of dollars.107 
 
12. Church of Greece 
When the Greek Revolution broke out, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, leader of 
the Greeks under the Tourkokratia, issued an anathema against the Greek 
Revolutionaries. Understanding the level of power that the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople wielded, prominent individuals of the new Greek nation-state who 
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were influenced by men such as Korais agreed to try and control Orthodoxy. In an 
attempt to break free from the reigns of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Theoklitos 
Pharmakides and Bavarian Vice-Regent Maurer proclaimed the Church of Greece in 
1833 that was autocephalous to the Patriarchate.108 While it initially disagreed, the 
Patriarch of Constantinople issued a document titled the Tomos in 1850 which 
accepted that the Church of Greece as an autocephalous church.109 
However, this agreement has led to a synallellia or co-synergy between the 
Church of Greece and the Greek nation-state whereby one reinforces the other and 
vice versa.110 Despite the intentions of Pharmakides and Maurer, the Church of 
Greece, part of the larger Patriarchate of Constantinople, officially became the 
National Church of the Greek Nation-State.111 Rather than promoting its official 
stance of protector of the genos or universal community of Christendom, the 
Church of Greece now promoted its position of protector of only the Greek 
ethnos. Thus, the agreement guaranteed that the Church of Greece maintains 
its original authority over the Greeks which is first and foremost witnessed in 
each Greek Constitution that begins with the preamble ‘In the Name of the 
Holy, Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity’ and includes the article ‘the 
predominant religion within Greek territory is that of the Eastern Orthodox 
Church of Christ’.112 
The Church of Greece is guaranteed such a status so long as it supports 
the government of the day, notwithstanding far-right dictatorships, in 
exchange for the nation-state also supporting their independence and 
previously established jurisdictions.113 Deepening this relationship, the Greek 
nation-state grants the Church with salaries, tax exemptions, benefits and 
property, including the entire peninsula of Mount Athos, in return for its 
influence throughout the state apparatus, primarily in education.114 Although 
freedom of religion is guaranteed by the nation-state, restrictions are in place 
so that any religions contrary to Orthodox Christianity do not contravene 
public order, offend morals and under any circumstances engage in 
proselytizing.115 The Church also wields a substantial amount of power by 
oppressing all those who criticise it through their excommunication or 
temporary removal from the Church and if the perceived threat is serious 
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enough, through an anathema or banishment from the Church and subsequently 
from Greek society.116 
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Chapter 2: 1975 – 1985 
 
1. Context 
The notion of a Third Hellenic Republic began to circulate immediately with the 
onset of the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus on July 20, 1974. With fears that Greece and 
Turkey would become embroiled in an all-out war over the island, Phaedon Gizikis 
of the Junta called a meeting that comprised of politicians and the heads of the 
armed forces who tried to establish a Government of National Unity, though the 
talks failed due to disagreements over who would be given the position to lead this 
government.117 After the meeting, Evangelos Averoff stayed back and engaged in 
further talks with Gizikis, suggesting that Karamanlis was the only person that could 
fulfil the task of transitioning Greece from a military dictatorship to a parliamentary 
democracy, particularly during a time of foreign and domestic urgency. 118 Once 
Gizikis agreed, Karamanlis was telephoned by his close friend Averoff who 
convinced him to return to Greece from self-exile in Paris and establish a 
Government of National Unity.119 
Karamanlis immediately made attempts at democratising Greece by first and 
foremost having a new constitution drafted while also declaring Greek Elections of 
1974 to be held on November 17.120 Karamanlis also freed all Greek political 
prisoners and those guilty of political crimes against the Junta, removed extreme 
collaborators from positions in government and in a significant reform that 
demonstrated political plurality was the legalisation of the Communist Party of 
Greece (KKE).121 In a further attempt to distance Greece from the past, Karamanlis 
was responsible for the Athens Trials where nineteen prominent members of the 
Junta were tried with treason and mutiny, including Papadopoulos, most of who 
were found guilty, dishonourably discharged from the Greek Army and spent the 
rest of their lives in jail.122 Upon his return to Greece, Karamanlis earnt himself the 
title from the Greek people 'Ethnarch of Democracy’. 123 
After the Greek Elections of 1974, Karamanlis became the Prime Minister and 
in an effort to solve the question of what type of government Greece would have, 
held the Greek Republic Referendum on December 8, 1974, which abolished the 
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monarchy for a republic with 69.2% in favour and 30.8% against.124 As New 
Democracy held an absolute majority in the Hellenic Parliament with 220 of 300 
seats, Karamanlis had the new Constitution of 1975 adopted and ratified.125 Once 
the Constitution of 1975 was adopted, the Hellenic Parliament elected Konstantinos 
Tsatsos to be President with 210 votes from 300 on the first ballot who gave 
Karamanlis the mandate to form a government.126 Karamanlis was, therefore, 
successful at transforming the Junta into the  Third Hellenic Republic.127 
 
2. Constitution 
The Constitution of 1975 outlined the way that Greece would now be 
democratically governed. For the first time, Greece became a proper and functional 
parliamentary presidential republic that was based on the principles of the welfare 
state, the separation of powers and the rule of law.128 The constitution also includes 
numerous articles on the rights and responsibilities of citizens which are 
guaranteed and unalterable, and included their rights to freedom, liberty and 
property.129 Above all else, popular sovereignty would be its most important aspect 
in that the Greek people, the citizens, are the source of all power. For example, 
Article 1, Excerpts 2-3 state “Popular sovereignty is the foundation of government. 
All powers derive from the People and exist for the People and the Nation; they 
shall be exercised as specified by the Constitution.”130  
The legislative or Hellenic Parliament consists of 300 parliamentarians or 
representatives from various political parties who are elected by Greek citizens 
through direct, universal, secret and compulsory elections.131 The executive or 
Greek Government consists of the Prime Minister and Ministers of the political 
party or coalition of parties who form a majority in the Hellenic Parliament with 150 
or more of 300 seats.132 The judiciary or the courts consist of the civil, criminal and 
administrative courts such as the Courts of Justice, the Courts of First Instance, the 
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Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court.133 The President is the Head of the 
Hellenic State and although the role is largely ceremonial, the President can declare 
war, sign peace treaties and most important of all, ensures the functioning of the 
Greek State.134 
The most imperative differences from all previous constitutions was the 
proper functioning of the Hellenic Parliament, comprised of MPs who represent the 
citizens, who create and present the legislation or laws to be debated.135 When a 
government is formed after elections, it is the responsibility of the government, in 
accordance with its policies, to enforce all the laws that have been enacted by the 
Hellenic Parliament in the day-to-day functioning of the Greek nation-state.136 If the 
time arises where a matter must be solved between a citizen and another citizen, as 
well as between a citizen and the state itself, it is the responsibility of the judiciary 
to interpret each case through these laws.137 The Constitution of 1975 was thus 
hailed by both Greeks and the West for introducing numerous democratic articles 
that had not been seen in Greece since the days of Venizelos. 
 
3. Citizenship 
Karamanlis reversed the Junta Constitutional Act that stripped Greek leftists and 
other dissidents or labelled enemies of their citizenship while allowing them, 
through special committees, re-acquire as well as pass on Greek citizenship.138 In a 
further attempt to maintain strong relations with the Greek Diaspora, Karamanlis 
also made the process of nationalisation of such Greeks significantly easier on the 
grounds of ius sanguinis or being born to a Greek father with citizenship.139 
Papandreou continued the work of Karamanlis by granting Greek women the right 
to transfer their citizenship to their children, extending the law of ius sanguinis.140 
Karamanlis and Papandreou also both made significant efforts toward Roma born 
in Greece by granting them Greek citizenship. 
However, neither Karamanlis or Papandreou granted the same concessions 
to non-ethnic Greek minorities such as the Albanians as they were not considered 
                                                            
133 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 87, Excerpts 1-2 
134 Greek Constitution, 1975, Articles 35-48 
135 Greek Constitution, 1975, Articles 51-54, 73-77 
136 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 82, Excerpts 1-4 
137 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 94, Excerpts 1-4 and Article 95, Excerpts 1-5 
138 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 25, Excerpts 1-4 
Greek Constitutional Act, 1974, Article 10 
139 Greek Citizenship Code, 1975, Article 1, Paragraph 1 
Greek Law 120/1914 
140 Greek Law 1438/1984 
36 
 
to meet the full criteria of Greek citizenship.141 Furthermore, non-ethnic Greeks 
who had been born and lived in the country but stripped of their Greek citizenship 
did not receive the opportunity to re-acquire it.142 Both Karamanlis and Papandreou 
were vehement in their enforcement of laws that aimed at minimising and 
controlling minority populations, mainly the Muslims in Thrace. For example, Article 
19 of the Greek Citizenship Code specifically states “A person of non-Greek ethnic 
origin leaving Greece without the intention of returning may be declared as having 
lost Greek nationality”.143 Non-ethnic Greeks who wanted to reside in Greece were 
given long residence or naturalisation requirements to deter them from achieving 
such an end.144 
Post-1974, Greek citizenship laws now made a strong distinction between 
homogenis and allogenis or ethnic Greeks and non-ethnic Greeks.145 In an attempt to 
make Greece ethnically and linguistically homogenous, non-Greeks were simply not 
granted Greek citizenship, particularly those viewed as coming from a hostile 
country and unable to fulfil Greek national consciousness. For those non-ethnic 
Greeks who had lost their citizenship, their re-acquisition was disallowed by Greece 
as a means of avoiding future problems with peoples designated as enemies of 
Greece. The strict immigration laws for non-ethnic Greeks finally acted as a 
deterrent for anyone not considered ‘Greek’ to live within its borders. 
 
4. Popular Sovereignty 
In the Greek Elections of 1974, the Greeks voted for Karamanlis who won with his 
newly established New Democracy (ND) by 54.4%, followed by the Centre Union-
New Forces with 20.4% and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) with 
13.6%. In the Greek Elections of 1977, Karamanlis was again victorious, although 
with a decrease receiving 41.8% and his new rival, Papandreou of PASOK coming in 
second with 25.3%. In the Greek Elections of 1981, the Greeks voted for 
Papandreou, a hard-line populist, who won with PASOK by 48.1%, followed by ND 
with 35.9%. Finally, in the Greek Elections of 1985 Papandreou was yet again 
victorious with 45.8% following by ND with a close 40.8%.  
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However, in the Greek Elections of 1974, Karamanlis was accused by 
Papandreou for using right-wing individuals who worked for the Junta to gain more 
votes through coercion.146 Despite this accusation and winning the Greek Elections 
of 1977, Karamanlis, to the dismay and questioning of ND, felt the need to leave his 
post by resigning as Prime Minister and instead becoming the President in 1980.147 
In the Greek Elections of 1981, Karamanlis accused Papandreou of using populism 
as a means of altering the vote of Greeks by re-igniting the Apostasia of 1965 and 
labelling ND MPs such as Mitsotakis as defectors and apostates who could not be 
trusted. In the Presidential Election of 1985, PASOK did not fulfil its duties as its MPs 
as they refused to participate, forcing Karamanlis to resign, and finally presenting 
their own Christos Sartzetakis to be President using colour ballot papers that 
allowed Papandreou to see who exactly voted for and did not vote for his 
selection.148  
While popular sovereignty was exercised through compulsory elections, there 
were critical moments by Karamanlis and Papandreou when it was not fully 
respected or enforced. Immediately after its implementation into Greece, the 
popular sovereignty or the power invested to the Greek people were not expressed 
freely and without falsification in supposed direct, universal and secret ballots that 
were abused. Furthermore, in an effort to ensure a political result at the expense of 
voters, the semi-proportional representation with a majority bonus system was 
clearly not respected. Such abuses that impact on the popular sovereignty of Greek 
citizens never resulted in prosecutions and punishments, even when usurpation 
and breaches occurred.149 
 
5. Political Parties 
Modelled on Gaullist principles, Karamanlis established New Democracy and 
advocated what he termed radical liberalism. Under this ideology, New Democracy 
emphasised strongly on conservative liberalism, Christian democracy and 
capitalism.150 His rival, Papandreou, established PASOK or what he simply termed 
‘the movement’ and prior to serving in office, advocated the ideology of left-wing 
nationalism and Euroscepticism. Once in office, Papandreou changed PASOK’s 
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ideology to be more in line with the moderate social liberalism and social 
democracy.151 
However, despite the return of democratic political parties, both Karamanlis 
and Papandreou adhered to the age-old Greek personality cult.152 Although 
Karamanlis was not the strongest leader and public speaker, he was a charismatic 
individual that was known to have a reputation for drive and efficiency in all his 
political activities which granted him a significant amount of influence over and 
respect from New Democracy.153 In contrast, Papandreou, simply known by his first 
name Andreas, a rare commodity in politics, was a very charismatic individual with 
all the things he said, earning him a respected reputation among those in PASOK. 
Further compounded by being the son of Georgios Papandreou and for his role 
during the Junta when he established the Panhellenic Liberation Movement that 
sought to overthrow the dictator and restore order, Papandreou can be described 
as Greece’s most influential leader.154 
The result of such leaders led to the abandonment of democratically 
organised parties, a strong rivalry between the two parties they represented and 
ultimately, to the inevitable establishment of the two-party system in Greece 
between New Democracy and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement.155 In an attempt 
to battle for the hearts and minds of the Greeks, Karamanlis used his position and 
advocated Greece under New Democracy as a nation-state of the West, EU and 
NATO. In contrast, Papandreou used his position and advocated Greece under 
PASOK as a nation-state that that the single and only purpose of serving the Greek 
people. Where Karamanlis expressed such a position through the motto “Greece 
belongs to the West”, Papandreou, in turn, coined his own and perhaps the 
stronger motto "Greece belongs to the Greeks".156 
 
6. Government 
The Karamanlis Governments were mainly tasked with democratisation policies in 
Greece that tried to reflect New Democracy’s pro-West image and transform Greece 
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from the days of the Junta.157 The Karamanlis Governments also rebuilt the Greek 
economy through their expansionist economic policies and were able to 
successfully acquire Greece’s membership to the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1981. In addition, the Papandreou Government focused the majority of its 
policies on social and economic reforms that had the goal of transforming Greece 
into a more democratic yet socialist nation-state. This was mainly achieved through 
the de-industrialisation of the country with a focus solely on the agricultural and 
service sectors. 
However, Karamanlis was accused by his opponents of not removing all 
right-wing individuals who worked for the Junta from his government and through 
the use of nepotism and party clientelism, used such individuals in their day to day 
activities.158 Further, the Karamanlis was accused by his opponents of using former 
Junta members via secret orders to help him gain votes at the Greek Elections in 
1977 through coercive measures as was the case during the Greek Elections in 
1974.159 However, it would be under the Papandreou Governments that such 
individual practices within political parties and government ministries would be 
transformed into national practices of clientelism, fuelled by Papandreou’s 
populism, of the government itself.160 Although PASOK was Eurosceptic when in the 
Opposition, once the Papandreou Government was in office it used Greece’s 
position within the EEC to play political games with in an attempt to shield and 
distract the latter from how it used funds that were granted to Greece.161 
The Papandreou Governments, therefore, had no restraint and consumed 
more than they produced, only meeting the costs of the country’s budget through 
further loans.162 The majority of these funds, as well as those that were borrowed 
unconditionally from various financial institutions, were used to maintain the 
expenditures of PASOK, vis-àvis economic packages such as the welfare system put 
in place to benefit the Greek population.163 While none of these events was ever 
truthfully communicated to the people in the official Government Gazette, by the 
end of the Second Papandreou Government, the country was in an economic 
disaster. While the people were left burdened with an extremely high, increasing 
and unsustainable debt due to PASOK’s loans, Greece’s inflation was continuously 
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increasing at a considerable pace with the only option to devalue the Greek 
drachma by 15% in 1983.164 
 
7. Checks and Balances 
In terms of checks and balances, there has not been a significant change in their 
implementation within each branch of government. The President was immediately 
granted a considerable amount of power over both the Greek Parliament as well as 
over the Greek Government itself that could be exercised at any time when he or 
she saw fit.165 In terms of the separation of powers, the Government and the 
Parliament were not independent of one another but rather, interdependent on 
one another in that the Government must hold the confidence of the Parliament 
while the Parliament must hold a majority to form a Government.166 Although the 
Courts were granted total independence from the Parliament and Government and 
were able to conduct their tasks freely, judges were at the mercy of the President 
who at any time could elect and dismiss such individuals.167 168 
However, from the beginning, Karamanlis chose one of his closest friends, 
Christos Sartzetakis, to be the President of the newly established Third Hellenic 
Republic. As Prime Minister, Karamanlis ensured if need be, he could easily 
influence Sartzetakis and the powers he held as President to fulfil personal 
interests without interference.169 Later, knowing full well that New Democracy 
would not win the Greek Elections of 1981, Karamanlis abruptly stood down as 
Prime Minister and became the President himself, using the position as a means to 
keep Papandreou in check from undermining the work he had achieved regarding 
NATO and the EU.170 When Papandreou became the Prime Minister, he used the 
notion of checks and balances not to guarantee the separation of powers of the 
Greek State but rather, as a means of exercising influence over the Greek people 
through various means such as bribes.171 
The virtual non-existence of official checks and balances has thus increased 
the unofficial checks and balances used by individuals such as Karamanlis and 
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Papandreou.172 Depending on who was the Prime Minister or President, checks and 
balances are simply a reflection of how such individuals have maintained or 
achieved their personal agendas and causes. Despite the fact that Sartzetakis and 
Karamanlis did not officially use the powers as President, the Parliament and to a 
greater extent the Government did, in fact, execute their powers, especially those 
that strengthened the centralization of power.173 Particularly viewed on a greater 
scale during the administration of Papandreou, he was able to further enforce the 
centralisation of power by maintaining a position that was always in favour of the 
majority ethnic Greek population while disregarding the interest of Greece’s 
minorities and to a lesser degree, Greek opposition groups.174 
 
8. Public Sector 
One of the most important challenges for Karamanlis and later Papandreou in this 
period was the emphasis on the public sector and its links with the political system. 
Initially, the public sector was to comprise of public servants whose allegiance is to 
the Greek people whereby, under the protection of the law, public servants are 
appointed by the government in various ministries to offer public services to the 
Greek people.175 In order to ensure no bias exists and the Greek State functions 
effectively, public servants must be free from any allegiances or memberships to 
political parties.176 If public servants wish to join a political party, stand for election 
or be elected to Parliament, they must resign from their positions in government, 
particularly higher ranking individuals part of independent authorities, the armed 
forces, police, ministries and so on.177 
In accordance with his economic policies, Karamanlis began to slowly grow 
the public sector through the naturalisation of a vast amount of enterprises, 
including the ports, that were either facing severe financial troubles or those that 
were newly established organisations.178 By taking things slowly, Karamanlis was 
able to offer more Greeks employment in the public sector, mostly in tourism and 
shipping, pleasing much to his advantage the middle class.179 However, in 
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accordance with his populist dogma, Papandreou appointed as many Greeks as 
possible to hundreds and thousands of public sector positions, many of whom 
were not qualified and had no experience, in exchange for political support.180 Such 
a status quo was maintained by Papandreou through the cooking of the books, 
which pleased the officials, as well as by Greece's Union of Public Sector Employees 
who defended public servants vehemently.181 
Although Karamanlis maintained the public sector at approximately 300,000 
employees, he used remittances gained from the Greeks in the Diaspora, 
considered a wealthy a cow to be milked, to help keep Greeks employed at home in 
such an unproductive atmosphere.182 Whether intentional or not, under 
Papandreou, the public sector became bloated with each respective government 
sector in the country being completely overstaffed.183 Papandreou’s populism of a 
Greece for the Greeks stemmed deep within the public sector and resulted in the 
age-old practice of clientelism on a national level where, in exchange for votes in 
the elections, Papandreou offered various positions, handouts and benefits to 
public servants. Arguably, Papandreou treated the public sector as a tool to gain 
and maintain votes at elections by offering jobs to anyone who in turn would 
reward their leader at the elections and as such, the public sector increased to 
approximately 500,000 employees by 1981 and to 700,000 by 1985.184 
 
9. Security 
Understanding the deep role, respect and significance the Hellenic Armed Forces 
had in the history of the Greeks, Karamanlis maintained the notion of serving one’s 
fatherland through conscription that was regulated by strict laws.185 In regards to 
the Hellenic Armed Forces, specifically the Hellenic Army, Karamanlis removed 
them from politics and brought them under the command of the President and 
Government.186 Karamanlis also disbanded the Greek Military Police in 1974 that 
had been the backbone of the Junta, establishing a new Military Police of the 
Hellenic Army with limited powers and the new motto of ‘Consciously Obey the 
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Laws’. In an effort at further reforms, particularly of their right-wing nature, 
Papandreou merged the Gendarmerie and Cities Police into the single Hellenic 
Police in 1984 to make the enforcement of law more civilian friendly.187 
As a result of what had happened in Cyprus, Karamanlis significantly 
increased the rearmaments of the Greek Army not with the assistance of the US 
due to its support of Turkey but rather, with the support of mainly France that 
helped with the establishment of a Greek military industry.188 Karamanlis increased 
the morale of the Hellenic Army by re-positioning units in areas of significant 
importance such as Western Thrace, the Aegean Islands and Cyprus, ensuring their 
defence capabilities.189 Due to heightened risk with Turkey in the Aegean Sea in the 
1980s, Papandreou expanded on these units so that they also acted as a deterrent 
against an attack due to their close proximity to important cities such as 
Constantinople and Smyrna in Turkey.190 However, Papandreou undermined what 
Karamanlis had achieved by drastically expanding the small yet professional force 
into a larger, less experienced force that was unable to keep up with equipment 
and personnel modernization.191 
Dissatisfied with the West’s lack of response to Turkey for its actions in 
Cyprus, Karamanlis chose the lesser of two evils where rather than declare war on 
Turkey, he chose for Greece to leave the military detachment of NATO.192 Rather 
than engaging Turkey, Karamanlis, with the help of then Defence Minister 
Evangelos Averoff, was able to transform the Hellenic Armed Forces into a 
professional and disciplined force capable of defending the Greek people and 
country.193 A year later, Karamanlis applied to re-join the military wing of NATO, a 
move that was vetoed by Turkey on the grounds of the Aegean Dispute, albeit due 
to the heightened threat from the USSR, Greece was able to re-join NATO under the 
status quo. Papandreou’s implementation of democratising measures was contrary 
to the very purpose of the military as they advocated a more civil nature and as a 
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result, soldiers were not training as hard, were less disciplined and had a very low 
morale.194 
 
10. Elites 
Karamanlis was born in Proti, Macedonia to Georgios Karamanlis and his wife in 
1907 and part of the larger Karamanlis Dynasty associated with the region of 
Serres. Karamanlis is also a descendant of the Karamanlides from Cappodocia in 
Asia Minor, though his family was relocated to Macedonia during the Population 
Exchange in 1923.195 His rival, Papandreou, was born in on the island of Chios to 
the three-time Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou and his wife the Sofia. Part of 
the larger Papandreou Dynasty, Papandreou followed in the footsteps of his father 
and was closely associated with the family stronghold in Achaea, Peloponnese.196 
Karamanlis, however, sought the position of the President for his own 
personal interests as at the time, it was the strongest position in the country due to 
its almost unlimited powers over the Prime Minister and Parliament. Karamanlis 
used such powers when he indirectly threatened to dissolve the Greek Parliament if 
he believed it did not reflect the popular will of the Greeks later under 
Papandreou.197 However, when Papandreou became Prime Minister, he used the 
position to his own advantage to introduce, on a national scale, the policy of 
populism in running the direction and action of the entire country.198 By doing so, 
Papandreou filled all the positions of the then PASOK Government with like-minded 
individuals who infiltrated all levels of government, giving him complete authority 
over matters that concerned their respective administrative areas.199 
Arguably, the fall of the Junta in 1974 had helped put the political elites in a 
slightly better situation whereby they have been the most prominent in filling 
positions of power such as the Prime Minister, President, Ministers and MPs.200 
Regardless of the ways in which Greek elites act while serving their term, they are 
all granted immunity from being prosecuted, arrested or imprisoned for all political 
crimes so long as they serve without any restrictions being imposed.201 
                                                            
194 C. Melakopides, “The Logic of Papandreou's Foreign Policy”, International Journal, Vol. 42, No. 3, 
1987, p. 578 
195 P. Comerford, “Defining Greek and Turk: Uncertainties in the search for European and Muslim 
Identities”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2000, pp. 249-250 
196 J. E. Miller, “Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick”, 
European History Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2014, pp. 529-530 
197 Greek Constitution, 1975, Articles 41, Excerpts 1-5 
198 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 82, Excepts 1-4 and Article 83, Excerpts 1-3 
199 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 103, Excerpts 1-5 
200 P. Lewis and G. Pridham, Stabilising Fragile Democracies, London, Routledge, 1996, p. 168 
201 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 62 
45 
 
Interestingly, even if MPs or Ministers were convicted, they can be granted a pardon 
for all political crimes they may or may not commit by the President, which is 
ironically consented by a three-fifths majority of Parliament.202 In essence, 
individuals such as Karamanlis and Papandreou, as well as their closest associates 
Rallis, Averoff or Charalambopoulos, were nonetheless immune from the law and 
de facto above it.203 
 
11. Church of Greece 
While the Orthodox Church was still the prevailing religion according to the Greek 
Constitution 1975, the recognition of the Greek State was more to respect the 
historical links with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and Holy Synod 
and not to impeach over citizens.204 The religious conscience of all citizens was thus 
recognised as an inviolable right or liberty. The religious freedom of citizens was 
therefore guaranteed and not a pre-requisite for any participation in Greek society, 
such as politicians who were not required to take their oath in the presence of the 
Holy Synod and swear to protect the prevailing religion.205 However, the Church of 
Greece was granted the ownership to the Holy Bible where any translations from 
the original Greek cannot be made without the consent of the Church.206 
Despite these changes, the Church of Greece still had a considerable amount 
of power within the Greek State due to the latter’s implementation within the Greek 
Constitution of’ ‘prevailing religion of Greece’. As a result of the power granted to 
the Church of Greece, the Greek State has indirectly agreed to the notion of 
secularising the State and politicising the Church which means there is not a 
separation between Church and State but rather, a separation of the State from the 
Church.207 By recognising that the Church of Greece is inseparably united in 
doctrine with the other Orthodox Churches and observing unwaveringly the holy 
apostolic and synodic canons and sacred traditions, the Greek State automatically 
introduces the indirect article for the holy canons within the constitution, causing 
conflict between State law and Church law.208 This is maintained through the 
authority it has over defined jurisdictions that are aligned with the territories of the 
country. 
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As a result, the clergy of the Church of Greece have a high status and receive 
special treatment from the Greek State such as salaries, pensions and the almost 
never-ending list of benefits.209 Property belonging to the Church of Greece as well 
as the Patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem and the Holy Monastery of 
Mount Sinai are not allowed to be subject to expropriation and are vehemently 
protected by the Greek State.210 Furthermore, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 
technically in a foreign country, has complete rule and authority over the 
Autonomous Monastic State of the Holy Mountain or simply Mount Athos, an entire 
peninsula in Greek Macedonia.211 More importantly, the Church of Greece has 
influence over laws it perceives as an offence to the public good of Orthodox 
Greece, such as proselytism, as well as over social practices such as education, 
abortions, civil marriages, cremation rights, to name a few.212 
 
12. Summary 
The period of 1974-1986 in Greece was indeed marked by significant changes, both 
positive and negative, in many of the country’s institutions. The greatest change 
came with the Constitution of 1975 that for the first time in the history of the Greek 
Nation-State, made significant attempts at laying down the foundations of the new 
democratic Greece, with limited errors. Probably the weakest institution discussed 
here is the checks and balances that still, in this new era of democratic transition 
failed to be properly implemented and executed. To such an end, the elites in 
Greece, mainly those of a hereditary nature, used the situation to their advantage 
by occupying many of the strongest positions in the country, unchecked and 
without any hindrance. 
In terms of who the citizens of post-Junta Greece would be, the old 
tendencies of ‘native’ versus ‘non-native’ Greek were a thing of the past with Greeks 
being represented as a collective group, though the same could not be said for 
Greece’s minorities who were not given the same treatment. Despite this error, the 
majority of the citizens represented the full force of the power in the country with 
their will being heard at elections and referendums while at times, those who 
represented their interests did act on their own accords for personal gain. Such 
representatives were undoubtedly found in the Parliament, comprised of two 
relatively democratic parties of the centre left and centre right that engaged one 
another in a democratic conduct in the public discourse while in private, struggled 
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to deal with the personal cult of party leaders that has lingered in Greece for much 
of its existence. To an even greater extent, the governments of the day were found 
to have successfully acted on behalf of their constituents, addressing many 
fundamental issues of the public such as the economy, whereas finding it difficult 
to resist the temptations of nepotism and clientelism within its ranks. 
The public sector felt the most effects of these problems by not being used as 
a tool to help citizens with their social needs but rather, being intentionally or 
unintentionally used as a tool to fulfil the needs of the state itself. On a very 
important front, the security of the country was effectively enhanced with the 
capabilities of the Hellenic Armed Forces being increased so that they were capable 
of both defensive and offensive tactics, particularly regarding Turkey. Finally, while 
it seems the Greek State tried to reign in the Church of Greece in order to make it 
subordinate to its will, it seems that as a result of the two-thousand-year presence 
of Orthodoxy, particularly the theocratic Orthodoxy developed during the Hellenic 
Empire and strengthened more so during the Ottoman Empire, such a notion failed 
drastically with the Church maintaining its power and influence. Nonetheless, the 
period of 1974-1986 in Greece can be described as an overall success in terms of its 
transition from military rule to democratic rule with the positive changes in its 
institutions far outweighing the negative mishaps. 
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Chapter 3: 1986 – 2000 
 
1. Context 
The period from 1986 to 2001 can be described as a time when democratic 
institutions in Greece were changing to a more democratic nature. In accordance 
with Article 110 and for the first time since its introduction in 1975, the Greek 
Constitution was revised in 1986 by the Papandreou-led PASOK Government, 
targeting mainly articles regarding the President. In terms of the source of power, 
Greek citizens partook in seven Greek national elections, four local elections and 
three European elections based on the controversial system of party-list 
proportional representation. Prior to the Communist Revolutions 1989 as well as 
after, the notion of citizenship was once again raised with the Greek State dealing 
with a severe increase of both ethnic Greeks as well as non-Greeks from former 
communist countries. 
The period would also see the arrival of two new elites, Constantine 
Mitsotakis of ND and Costas Simitis of PASOK. While Andreas Papandreou 
remained on the political scene, his new rival would be Konstantinos Mitsotakis 
until he later died on June 23, 1996. As one can expect, ND and PASOK were the 
main parties of the period with the latter winning most of the elections and 
extending its domination over the political spectrum on all levels. However, at 
home, of concern to both camps was the dependent Greek economy on foreign 
support and whether it should remain public with state intervention or private 
intervention from various organisations such as the EU. 
Due to its historical role, the Greek Orthodox Church continued its 
involvement in the affairs of the Greek State through various dilemmas, the most 
notable being the issue of Greek ID cards and their removal of religious affiliation.  
In addition, Greece had been focused on facing the hostile actions of Turkey, 
primarily in the Aegean Sea, with the threat of war almost being realised in 1987 
and 1996, and with its involvement in the Yugoslav Wars. Due to its historical role, 
the Greek Orthodox Church continued its involvement in the affairs of the Greek 
State through various dilemmas, the most notable being the issue of Greek ID cards 
and their removal of religious affiliation. As such, whether these changes during 
this period were effective is yet to be seen. 
 
2. Constitution 
The purpose of the revisions to the Greek Constitution in 1986 was to transform 
Greece into a functioning parliamentary democracy.213 In total, eleven articles were 
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amended, all of which focused solely on the powers of the President regarding the 
executive branch of government.214 The President could no longer dissolve, call for 
a direct vote of no confidence and veto legislation within the Hellenic Parliament, 
could not dismiss the government or proclaim elections, and could not declare a 
state of siege and suspend articles in the constitution, leaving the position of the 
President into a purely ceremonial one.215 For example, Article 35, Excerpt 1 now 
stated that "No act of the President of the Republic shall be valid nor be executed 
unless it has been countersigned by the competent Minister...."216 
The reforms made by Papandreou dramatically changed the political 
landscape in the country regarding the extent of powers the Prime Minister now 
had.217 Based on their political position, the Prime Minister had the sole 
responsibility of defining and directing the general policy of Greece both in terms of 
its domestic policies and foreign policies.218 The Prime Minister also had sole 
control over directing the actions of his government by selecting all Ministers, 
Undersecretaries and deciding on what exercised powers they will be given as well 
as selecting all of their tasks.219  In a further attempt at limiting the role of the 
President, any messages that he or she wanted to relay to the Greek people had to 
be sighted and consented by the Prime Minister.220 
The move by Papandreou was clearly self-motivated to ensure that the 
President was powerless and that the Prime Minister held the most powerful 
position in the country on all levels.221 Although the reforms were questioned by 
many at the time, the Prime Minister, so long as he had a majority in the Hellenic 
Parliament, could easily draft, pass and implement any piece of legislation he 
deemed fit.222 Furthermore, these new powers would ultimately stop the President 
from ever having the opportunity to endanger the current or future PASOK 
Governments so long as they held the popular consent of the Greek people.223 
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While no President had ever used their powers against the Greek Government, the 
result of this change meant that the President could not effectively deal with future 
moments of severe political instability or conflict that emerged in Greece and 
tended to lead to out of control situations such as the National Schism.224 
 
3. Citizenship 
Both prior to and more so after the Communist Revolutions 1989-1991, Greece 
acknowledged the fact that it had to deal with a large amount of repatriated Greeks 
who wanted to return or resettle in Greece from the former Eastern Bloc, many of 
which settled in Greece as early as 1984.225 It was also faced with non-Greeks from 
both the Eastern Block and Third World who, fleeing their own homelands because 
of war or poverty, wanted to pass through into Europe with a minority who wanted 
to resettle in Greece in search of a better life.226 Until 1991, and quite surprisingly 
due to the fact that Greece had accepted numerous repatriated Greeks during the 
years of the Megali Idea, the only legislation of the Greek State regarding 
immigration dated back to 1927. For example, the Presidential Decree of August 12, 
1927, stated that “non-ethnic Greeks who wish to enter Greece as a migrant must 
obtain a work permit prior to entering the country, which will only be granted after 
the migrant has acquired a job in Greece.” 227 As this was not feasible with such a 
large influx of people that ranged from approximately 200,000 to 800,000, and as 
Greece had obligations part of the EU and under international law, it tried to deal 
with immigration by introducing legislation in 1991, two presidential decrees in 
1997 and another piece of legislation in 2001.228 
For the most part, these laws or decrees were irrelevant as Greek 
immigration policy still made a sharp distinction between repatriated ethnic Greeks 
and non-Greeks labelled as foreigners.229 For repatriated Greeks, citizenship was 
offered, though this did not make up for the lack of policies or resources available 
to help them assimilate back into Greek society after such as long absence.230 
However, for non-Greeks, Greece ensured its immigration policies acted as a 
deterrent against foreigners from entering the country with a rise in border patrols, 
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controlled crossings and the scarce granting of visas.231 It did not matter if a 
migrant was legal or illegal as if they were deemed non-Greek, they virtually had no 
rights, were socially excluded and faced deportation.232 
Greece was without an effective and successful immigration policy that was 
both fair and firm, serving the interests of both the Greek people and helping those 
in need.233 Repatriated Greeks, particularly Pontians and mixed-marriage Pontians, 
like so many before them, faced discrimination within Greek society, although they 
were eventually and successful integrated.234 While Greece tried to ensure that 
foreigners would avoid entering its borders altogether, the reverse happened with 
hundreds of thousands if not a million migrants entering the country illegally and 
remaining there in a state of limbo.235 In any case, non-Greeks became victims of all 
sorts of discrimination in all levels of Greek society with some being abused by 
political xenophobes, social exclusionists and more vehemently, economic 
opportunists with no official government policies for integration.236 
 
4. Popular Sovereignty 
Although the Greek Elections 1989 were held in June with Constantine Mitsotakis of 
ND coming first with 40.8%, the newly introduced proportional representation did 
not allow him to gain a majority of 151 seats which led to further Greek Elections in 
November where he came first with 44.3%, again unable to win the required 
seats.237 Finally, in the Greek Elections 1990, Mitsotakis was able to gain a slight 
majority in the Hellenic Parliament winning 46.2% with 152 seats.238 However, the 
                                                            
231 L. Figgou, “Constructions of ‘Illegal’ Immigration and Entitlement to Citizenship: Debating an 
Immigration Law in Greece”, Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, Vo. 26, No. 2, 2015, 
pp. 728-729 
232 L. K. Cheliotis, “Behind the Veil of Philoxenia: The Politics of Immigration Detention in Greece”, 
European Journal of Criminology, Vol. 10, No. 6, 2013, pp. 151-152 
233 A. Triandafyllidou, “Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the 21st Century: Lack of Political Will 
or Purposeful Mismanagement?” European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2009, pp. 160-
164 
234 A. Konsta and G. Lazaridis, “Civic Stratification, ‘Plastic’ Citizenship and ‘Plastic Subjectivities’ in 
Greek Immigration Policy”, Journal of International Migration and Integration, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2010, pp. 
378-379 
235 P. Kiprianos, S. Balias and V. Passas, “Greek Policy towards Immigration and Immigrants”, Social 
Policy and Administration, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2003, pp. 151-153 
236 S. Chtouris, “Understanding Xenophobia in Greece: A Correspondence Analysis”, European Journal 
of Sociology, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 107-110 
237 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, June 18 and November 5, 1989 
http://www.ypes.gr/en/Elections/NationalElections/Results/nationallectures1989/ (Accessed 
12/09/2015) 
238 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, April 8, 1990 
52 
 
period was dominated largely by Papandreou and later, Constantine Simitis of 
PASOK who won the elections with a majority in 1993 with 46.88%, 1996 with 
41.49% and 2000 with 43.79%.239 While local elections were held in 1986, 1990, 
1994, 1998 and 2002, and European elections in 1989, 1994 and 1999, these mainly 
reflected the results of the national elections.240 
However, from June of 1989 until April of 1990, Greece was faced with the 
onset of political instability between rivals ND and PASOK.241 The reason Mitsotakis 
was not able to form a government in the June and November elections of 1989 
was the result of proportional representation introduced by PASOK.242 Rather than 
gaining seats based on a majority or plurality of votes, proportional representation 
ensures political parties receive seats in proportion to the number of votes they 
receive, so long as they pass the 3% threshold.243 While Mitsotakis won the 
elections, he did not gain enough of a percentage to ensure ND gained 151 seats, 
rendering him unable to form a government on two occasions, and if a counting 
mistake had not been picked up in 1990, the same result would have reoccurred.244 
Almost a year passed in Greece without an official Greek Government elected 
in by the Greek people.245 Instead, Greece was governed by a Coalition 
Government, a Caretaker Government and another Coalition Government until a 
political party was able to surpass 151 seats.246 In Greece, proportional 
representation has been quested as a method used by political parties to ensure 
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the existence and functioning of the two party system of ND and PASOK.247 While 
the intention of proportional representation is to ensure all political parties are 
considered on an equal level, the dominance of ND and PASOK ensured that once 
all votes had been counted, and with the exception of minor parties such as the 
KKE, they would inevitably be elected with more seats divided between them.248 
 
5. Political Parties 
As can be expected from someone with family links to the Venizelos Family, 
Mitsotakis was a proud Cretan, a vehement liberal and a man with strong 
connections put towards his endeavour for a modern Greece.249 Inside as well as 
outside the Hellenic Parliament, Mitsotakis was known as a harmful, effective and 
at times, ruthless public speaker and debater who was best known for his ability as 
a negotiator who could overcome many domestic and foreign obstacles.250 In a 
similar fashion, Simitis, who had begun his political career on the radical left 
spectrum, had also come to believe in a modern and European Greece.251 Simitis 
was known as an extremely hard working individual with a professional posture in 
all things he did, gaining him the respect of Greek MPs as well as the Europeans 
who admired him profoundly for his meticulous and serious attitude.252 
Despite their credentials, both Mitsotakis and Simitis became victims of the 
Greek political system and more specifically, of the personality cult.253 Neither 
Mitsotakis or Simitis were able to effectively take on the position of Prime Minister 
as they did not fulfil the criteria of being the right type of charismatic leader who 
was loved not for what he knew but for what he was.254 In both cases, their 
downfall was the result of not pleasing all members of their respective party or 
government with their policies or decisions made on behalf of the Greek people.255 
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This was largely due to the fact that neither, regardless of their professional skills to 
be Prime Minister, were able to win the hearts and minds of ND of PASOK MPs.256 
Mitsotakis was the first to fall victim to the personality cult when in 1993, MPs 
of ND disagreed with his position on the Macedonia dispute, as well as the Cyprus 
dispute that in their view was far too lenient. As a result, these MPs led by Antonis 
Samaras withdrew their support from the Mitsotakis Government and formed their 
own political party called the Politiki Anixi or Political Spring, ultimately leading to a 
loss of majority seats, the declaration of the Greek Elections of 1993 and Mitsotakis' 
resignation. In addition, Simitis became the next victim in 2004 when the majority 
of old guard PASOK MPs who served under his flamboyant predecessor Andreas 
Papandreou alienated Simitis for his eksynchronismos or modernization rhetoric that 
was viewed as simply Germanic. Understanding PASOK MPs did not accept his 
leadership style and in an effort to avoid discontent with Greek voters, Simitis 
resigned in 2004 and passed the leadership to George Papandreou. 
 
6. Government 
The Papandreou Government of 1986-1989 continued its populist rhetoric of a 
‘Greece for the Greeks’ and ‘Change’ that was reinforced by their continuous 
socialist reforms, though in a positive step, established the World Council of 
Hellenes Abroad (SAE) that had the purpose of representing ethnic Greeks living 
outside Greece.257 With the win of ND, the Mitsotakis Government of 1990-1993 
focused on resolving the problems created by the previous Papandreou 
Governments such as its overspending, borrowing of loans and inflation.258 The 
Papandreou Government of 1993-1996, however, raised concerns about the 
economy towards the end of its administration and did in fact tone down its anti-
European and US rhetoric.259 The successor Simitis Governments of 1996-2001, the 
first under PASOK without Papandreou, tasked itself with minor economic reforms 
while trying to keep a socialist face, organised Greece to adopt the Euro and made 
preparations for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games.260 
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As we have already learnt, the Papandreou Governments may have 
theoretically meant to cater for the needs of the Greek people but such populist 
rhetoric led to disastrous policies backed by an over exhausted budget, paving the 
way for unemployment and a stunt in growth.261 The Mitsotakis Government was 
successful at introducing several liberal reforms that helped increase privatisation 
in the country, made cuts to the pension system, modernised labour laws and 
updated the education system.262 The Simitis Governments, through their reforms 
under the policy Eksynchronismos or Modernisation, salvaged the Greek economy by 
lowering the deficit and inflation, tightening its fiscal and monetary policy and 
further modernising labour laws. A further accomplishment of Simitis was replacing 
the drachma with the euro in 2001, bringing Greece closer to its EU partners.263 
Although both the Mitsotakis Government and Simitis Governments targeted 
Greece’s looming economic issues, both were unable to solve them fully as the 
problem ran deep within the social fabric of the country.264 In truth, what had been 
done by previous ND and PASOK Governments, mainly those of Karamanlis and 
more so Papandreou would take decades to recover from irrespective of a few 
pieces of legislation under Mitsotakis or Simitis such as Law 2874/2000, Law 
2956/2001 or Law 3144/2003. Furthermore, both Mitsotakis and Simitis were 
constantly at the forefront of choosing between policies that served the EU such as 
further reforms at modernisation or policies that served the Greek people such as 
continuing past practices.265 The hardest form of governance these two individuals 
thus faced was introducing reforms that were modern though detrimental to the 
Greek people or reforms that were traditional though detrimental to the Greek 
State.266 
 
7. Checks and Balances 
While Papandreou rarely spoke of checks and balances within the Greek political 
system, his constant absence from the Hellenic Parliament during his tenure can be 
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interpreted as his lack of concern for the notion.267  Mitsotakis was no stranger to 
the blatant disregard for checks and balances when earlier in his career, he was 
involved in a dispute with President Sartzetakis who he believed was not valid as 
the election for the President was not conducted in secret as it was supposed to 
be.268 As Prime Minister, he believed in the re-foundation of the Greek State itself, 
that is, conducting further revisions to the Greek Constitution that dealt with the 
introduction and enforcement of checks and balances into the separation of 
powers.269 Although Simitis shared his insight, he believed in the implementation of 
checks and balances into the Greek political system, namely in separating the 
conjoined legislative and executive, though in strict accordance with the social 
welfare state that emphasised in the responsibility of the Greek State to the Greek 
people.270 
Mitsotakis was not able to revise the Greek Constitution in favour of checks 
and balances as at the time, he had a weak and fragile parliamentary majority.271 As 
a result, he was later forced to dissolve the Hellenic Parliament and call for 
elections, strongly to the advantage of PASOK who had criticised his efforts.272 
Simitis faced similar problems in the beginning as political rules introduced by his 
predecessors made it difficult to address change and implement checks and 
balances, usually because of a lack of parliamentary majority or waiting periods.273 
The struggle to implement strong checks and balances by Mitsotakis and Simitis 
resulted in their constant conflicts between tradition and modernity.274 
This struggle made it difficult for Mitsotakis and Simitis because they were 
both part of small factions within ND and PASOK respectfully against larger factions 
who were accustomed to tradition and their old habits.275 While efforts were 
attempted or tried, any steering away from the status quo meant Mitsotakis and 
Simitis had would be up against the old political guard that was never too occupied 
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to organise leadership rivals and factional struggles to remove the agitators.276 As 
such, Mitsotakis and Simitis were forced to work in the system and rather than fully 
trying to change it through their policies of checks and balances for accountable 
MPs, ministers and public servants, they adopted the role of ‘leader’ like Karamanlis 
and Papandreou before them.277 In this regard, they themselves became heavily 
controlling and interfering in terms of how their governments ran, participated in 
making family alliances for political ends rather than relationships with experienced 
individuals.278 
 
8. Public Sector 
New rival and leader of ND Mitsotakis constantly debated against Papandreou in 
the Hellenic Parliament and criticised him for dependence on foreign loans to 
finance these state expenses.279 Although a sensitive issue for Greeks, when 
Mitsotakis became Prime Minister, he swore that he would trim both spending and 
employees in the Greek public sector.280 Although Simitis tried to introduce various 
stabilisation reforms in the public sector as the Minister of National Economy for 
Papandreou 1985-1987, these were severely undermined as they were contrary 
Papandreou’s handouts for votes scheme, reiterated to reassure Greeks by Finance 
Minister Dimitris Tsovolas in the Greek Elections 1989 under the slogan ‘Tsovola, 
dosta ola’ or ‘Tsovola, give it all.’281 Later as Prime Minister, he was vehement to 
continue his policies in the public sector that included a vast reorganisation and 
stabilisation to reduce inflation and deficits.282 
Although many of the scandals in the public sector persisted such as 
clientelism, Mitsotakis did make cuts, did not renew contracts of such employees 
and abolished programs established by PASOK thought to be extravagant.283 In an 
effort to combat the high Public Sector Borrowing Requirement at 14.6 percent in 
1992, Mitsotakis froze both salaries and pensions until Law 2025 was passed that 
granted the appropriate Minister to impose limits on wages and pensions.284 
Simitis, who understood well how deep clientelism ran into the Greek public sector 
and Greek psyche, was faced with many difficulties in trying to change such an 
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outlook, particularly by recalcitrant unions.285 Nonetheless, many of his notable 
policies included a decrease in deficit spent on the public sector from 13% to 1%, 
labour productivity increased to 2.6% and the halving of membership in unions to 
440,000.286 
Even though Mitsotakis was trying to introduce policies that reformed the 
public sector, many proved to be at the dissatisfaction of the Greek people who 
under the Mitsotakis Government, lost 13% of their wages because he abolished 
the indexation of their wages to inflation.287 Although Mitsotakis was also able at 
incorporating new laws regarding Greek banks in accordance with the EU as well as 
liberal policies to help undo PASOK mismanagement, keeping the EU satisfied did 
not prove useful nor in favour of maintaining the people's mandate, with many 
Greeks taking to the streets in strikes, rallies and protests against his 
government.288 Simitis faced many attacks from within his own party by trying to 
undo PASOK mismanagement as, according to his accusers, he was trying to make 
the economic situation for the Greek people who served the government worse 
off.289 However, by effectively undermining these people, his policies toward the 
public sector targeted its populist recruitment strategy, attacked the ongoing 
clientelistic relationships and curtailed the bloated public sector.290 
 
9. Security 
Throughout the period, Greece maintained its military expenditure at 
approximately 3.5% of GDP or approximately 2 billion euros that was largely due to 
its tense relations with Turkey over sovereignty disputes in the Aegean and later, 
over Turkey’s insistence on a ‘Turkish Minority’ in Western Thrace which Greece 
identified only as a ‘Muslim Minority’.291 The period is also marked by Greece’s first 
involvement and participation in the engagements of NATO and the UN. In 1986, 
Greece reformed the Central Intelligence Service by renaming it to the National 
Intelligence Service and making it a civilian agency under the former Ministry of 
Public Order rather an independent and often rogue agency.292 In 2000, Greece 
reorganised the Ministry of Public Order, renaming it the Ministry of Public Order 
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and Citizen Protection and introducing reforms that targeted the Hellenic Police 
divided its headquarters into various central authorities throughout the country 
whose jurisdiction is limited to their respective areas.293 
Despite Greece’s security concerns, its military expenditure was criticised by 
MPs mainly from ND as it was the highest in the EU, second highest in NATO in 
terms of overall GDP, and did not counter Turkey as it still questioned Greece’s 
sovereignty in the Aegean, almost leading to war on two occasions with the Thasos 
Incident in 1987 and Imia Incident in 1986.294 In an effort to uphold the ideas of 
peace and security, Greece successfully participated in the Gulf War 1990-1991, 
Yugoslav Wars 1992 - 2004, Somali War 1993 - 1995 and Congo War 1999 - 2011, 
though was criticised by the West for allowing Greek Mercenaries to fight on the 
side of the Serbs in Bosnia, participating in the Srebrenica Massacre. On the other 
hand, the National Intelligence Agency was effective on part of its mission and 
protected and promoted Greece's national strategic interests by preventing and 
confronting any threats to its democracy and the human rights of its citizens. 
Although Greece’s reforms of the Hellenic Police aimed at making it more civilian 
friendly, the Hellenic Police constantly engaged with the terrorist organisation 
Revolutionary Organization 17 November or N17 who committed attacks against 
representatives of state via small arms fire, car bombs, improvised explosive 
devices and rocket-propelled grenades.295 
Greece’s military expenditure has resulted in billions of dollars being spent 
on its large military which has become a significant burden on the Greek economy. 
Nevertheless, Greece can be described as having an effective army, navy and air 
force that is capable of defending the Greek people and country, regardless of the 
cost. However, the National Intelligence Service was unable to counter and confront 
Turkey's actions against its territorial integrity, national wealth and overall national 
security, as well as in cooperating with the Hellenic Police at preventing the 
activities of terrorist organisations. In addition, while the Greek Government 
established the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (EKAM) whose sole purpose was to 
protect individuals and buildings that represented the government, due to its 
ongoing battle with N17, the Hellenic Police have evolved into a more aggressive 
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organisation that has frequently broken its rules on the use of force and used 
excessive force against citizens such as those protesting government policies.296 
 
10. Elites 
Although the period was marked with the new liberal Constantine Mitsotakis, the 
Mitsotakis Family is linked to the Venizelos Family, with Mitsotakis' grandfather 
Kostis Mitsotakis marrying Katigo Venizelou, the sister of Eleftherios Venizelos, his 
father Kyriakos Mitsotakis was first cousins with Venizelos through his wife 
Stavroula Ploumidaki, and Mitsotakis himself being the nephew of Venizelos.297 In 
addition to their family lineage, the Mitsotakis Family and Venizelos Family were 
connected politically, with Mitsotakis' grandfather and Venizelos forming the Liberal 
Party together in Crete, the Pact of Halepa of 1878 taking place in Mitsotakis' home 
and the former's son serving in the First Balkan War and as an MP for Chania, 
Crete.298 While the Simitis Family can only trace its political history back to World 
War II, Kostas Simitis' father Georgios Simitis was nonetheless a leader of the 
National Liberation Front (EAM) where he met his mother Fani Christopoulou, a 
lifelong and prominent left-wing feminist.299 Later, Costas himself would become a 
founding member and participant of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK) 
established by Andreas Papandreou with the aim of gaining international support 
against the Junta.300 
Despite the new outlook Mitsotakis and Simitis had for Greece, and while 
neither have yet to be proven guilty, accusations have been made that both, like 
many Greek politicians such as Papandreou, have been involved in Greek political 
scandals.301 The majority of these scandals revolve around making money through 
illegal means such as through bribes, embezzlements or laundering.302 On an even 
more shocking level, Greek politicians have also been involved in making money 
through legal yet deceitful means such as budgetary lies, ministerial overruns, 
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government owned business mismanagements, to name but a few.303 To no one’s 
surprise, the involvement of Greek politicians is that they will allow such scandals to 
occur, legally or illegally, so long as they get their cut or fair share.304 
Those who are most powerful in the country are thus free to do as they 
please in a never-ending cycle that continues on from one generation to the next.305 
While their scandals may or may not become public knowledge, Greek politicians 
such as Mitsotakis and Simitis are immune from facing any charges and as such, 
are free from any accountability.306 This creates an even bigger problem for the 
Greek Taxation Authority (DOY) as it does not have the authority nor the will to 
monitor the transactions made by Greek politicians or elites for privacy reasons 
embedded in Greek law.307 Although corrupt on many levels itself, even if the DOY 
was able to monitor such transactions, it would prove to be a difficult task as the 
gap has not been closed on the many black holes in the country, as result of 
transactions made in the real economy and those in the black economy.308 
 
11. Church of Greece 
The Greek Orthodox Church tried to present itself as understanding of the 
modernising Greek people that was willing to slowly modernise with agreeing to a 
hallmark decision that legalised the performance of abortions in 1986.309 The 
following year, the Hellenic Parliament also passed a law to expropriate land 
belonging to the Church of Greece and to redistribute it amongst Greeks living well 
below the poverty line. The Hellenic Parliament also passed a law that called for the 
Greek Government to take over the administration of property belonging to the 
Church of Greece in urban areas. However, both ND and PASOK, which comprised 
the overwhelming majority in the Hellenic Parliament at the time, excluded the 
concept of the separation of church and state when discussions were held on 
revisions to the Greek Constitution in 1998. 
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However, when the Church of Greece involved itself in the Hellenic 
Parliament, it was able to prevent the Greek Government from expropriating its 
property by totally opposing any nationalisations regarding their land. 
The Church of Greece was also successful by preventing the very notion of the 
separation of church and state from being proposed in 1998 when it continuously 
slandered MPs until its position was heard.310 The attacks by the Church of Greece 
also continued against the Greek Government 2000-2001 by organising mass 
rallies, protests and petitions when the latter wanted to remove from state identity 
cards.311 Furthermore, it ignored and pleaded ignorance to any requests made by 
the Greek Government to adhere to decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights that dealt with recognising the assembly and practice of non-Orthodox 
religions.312 
 Throughout this period and by its actions, the Church of Greece effectively 
reinforced its position of authority as the protector of the Greek ethnos.313 By 
interfering in the legislation of the Hellenic Parliament as well as in the affairs of the 
Greek Government itself, the Church of Greece was able to influence most issues in 
accordance with its position, particularly when they concerned the Orthodoxy of 
the Greek people such as with the ID cards. The Church of Greece also 
demonstrated control over Greece itself through the sheer amount of land and 
property it maintains under its jurisdiction and ownership that is not up for any 
discussion. Finally, the Church of Greece used the advice of the EU as a means of 
advocating it as an interventionist regime that it countered through anti-Western 
messages to the Greek people via its numerous radio stations, newspapers and 
television appearances.314 
 
12. Summary 
From 1986 to 2001, democratic institutions in Greece can be described as 
undergoing various challenges as they continued to evolve from the Metapoliftefsi 
away from Karamanlis and Papandreou.  While revisions to the Greek Constitution 
in 1896 by Papandreou had the intention of transforming Greece into a full 
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parliamentary democracy, the changes removed most powers of the President and 
transferred them to the Prime Minister, making the position the most powerful in 
the country. The rivalry for power is best seen in the Hellenic Parliament as even 
though elections took place on all levels, it did not stop competing factions from 
causing disruptions and periods of political instability from occurring with only self-
interests at mind and not the electorate. Interestingly, the electorate was expanded 
with expatriate Greeks from the East being granted citizenship, while non-Greeks 
entering the country lacked any sort of rights, created a divide within Greek society 
between Greeks and foreigners. 
Ironically, Mitsotakis and Simitis, like their predecessors, had links to the old 
political guard who comprise the strongest political families in the country, 
inevitably deciding their fate as individuals who would be part of public and closed 
scandals with corruption at its heart in the name of maintaining power. Throughout 
these years, both ND and PASOK dominated the Hellenic Parliament, with 
Mitsotakis representing the former and Simitis representing the latter, both who 
despite their skills were not considered effective Prime Ministers because they 
lacked the personality cult of the job. Despite this, the PASOK and ND Governments 
made successful ground with many foreign issues between Greece and its 
neighbours FYR and Turkey, though at home, domestic issues lingered with the 
problems of the economy being the most severe. Such a problem was the public 
sector that both Mitsotakis and Simitis targeted in their reforms that were 
unpopular amongst Greeks and all those in the system who had been accustomed 
to its clientelism. 
Clientelism, like many of the other dysfunctionalities embedded in the Greek 
system, also affected both Mitsotakis and Simitis from introducing policies aimed at 
checks and balances as the old political guard both within their governments and 
parties strongly believed in upholding their traditions, leaving these individuals to 
working part of such a system without accountability. The reason behind this 
xenophobia is the result of Greece's issues with its neighbours, ranging from 
Northern Epirus with Albania, Macedonia with the FYR, the Aegean with Turkey and 
even communism with the Eastern Bloc, issues that Greece arguably dealt with 
both positively and negatively. 
Finally, while the Greek Orthodox Church presented itself to the West as a 
modernising organisation, it continued its medieval policy in Greece and the East as 
the sole protector of the Greek ethnos, even at the expense of the Greek State. 
While democratic institutions in Greece from 1986 to 2001 had many opportunities 
for modernisation, these were either short lived or unsuccessful as they, along with 
their instigators, became consumed by the Greek system. As we can see, the period 
from 1986-2001 can be described as one with numerous issues relating to Greece’s 
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democratic institutions, although it must be pointed out that significant gains were 
made in many areas by Mitsotakis and Simitis who helped move Greece away from 
the errors of the Metapolitefsi period towards a more modern and liberal Greece.  
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Chapter 4: 2001 – 2007 
 
1. Context 
In this chapter, the various institutions of the Greek State will be explored from 
2001-2008. The chapter will firstly begin with the revisions that occurred to the 
Greek Constitution in 2001 under the PASOK Government of Simitis. Following this 
will be a further look at Greece's citizenship debate, in this period again with the 
distinction between ethnic Greeks and non-Greeks. As citizens who form the core of 
the democracy in the country through their popular sovereignty, changes to the 
political system will be explored. 
 Furthermore, the chapter will discuss Simitis' new rival in the Hellenic 
Parliament, Kostas Karamanlis and his leadership of New Democracy. His 
leadership will also lead to the establishment of the Karamanlis Government for 
two terms. It is through these controversial terms that the issue of checks and 
balances will be assessed from the viewpoint of Karamanlis. In addition, the 
chapter will explore various aspirations toward the public sector by the Karamanlis 
Government such as their privatisation policies. 
On a more specific level, its policies in terms of security, namely for the 
Olympic Games and military expenditure will be analysed. As per the norm, 
Karamanlis, an elitist with links to the Karamanlis Dynasty, will be exposed through 
one of the many scandals he was involved in. Finally, the Church of Greece will be 
mentioned in terms of how it, as the most powerful institution in the country, 
interacted with the Greek State. The chapter will thus conclude with a summary of 
each of these institutions and if and how they have progressed between 2001-2008. 
 
2. Constitution 
Revisions to the Greek Constitution in 2001 amended a total of seventy-nine from 
eighty-three proposed articles by then Prime Minister Simitis.315 Revisions were first 
and foremost made to the expansion of and inclusion of new individual and social 
rights for Greek citizens.316 Revisions were also made to Greece's separation of 
powers, targeting the Hellenic Parliament by modernising its functional ability, the 
Government by upgrading local authority and the Courts by being officially 
recognised as one of the independent authorities in the country.317 For example, 
Article 93, Excerpt 3 states "Every court judgment must be specifically and 
thoroughly reasoned and must be pronounced in a public sitting."318 
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Rights that were extended to Greek citizens, to name a few, included the 
protection of health and genetic identity, protection of property against 
confiscation, the protection of personal information, and a provision for the 
freedom and operation of the mass media.319 Within the Parliament, parliamentary 
committees were strengthened, professional occupations of MPs were prohibited, 
preconditions were introduced for the modification of electoral laws and an organ 
was established that monitored and controlled expenditures of political parties 
during elections.320 Organs were also set up for the respective Greek Government 
for consultation purposes with the adoption of a new framework regarding criminal 
prosecutions of each respective Cabinet if need be.321 The Supreme Administrative 
Court, Supreme Civil and Criminal Court or the Court of Audit were given the 
authority to rule against statutes that have been judged to be contrary to the Greek 
Constitution with the Head of the Supreme Court given a four-year term.322 
The revisions to the Greek Constitution in 2001 can be described as the most 
important to date as they demonstrate the pursuit by Greece to remain a modern 
and democratic nation of Europe and a respective member of the international 
community that embraces democratic values.323 The significance of extended and 
new rights and liberties granted to Greek citizens, particularly those relating to the 
welfare state, demonstrates the inclusiveness of all Greek citizens by the Greek 
Government, particularly those that are perceived as different.324 In addition, the 
specific mentioning of the Welfare State in the Greek Constitution itself was a 
hallmark move as it officially highlighted the Greek State’s attempt at advocating 
itself as the responsible provider of Greek citizens who may need some sort of 
financial assistance.325 Furthermore, revisions to the separation of powers were a 
further step at distancing the Hellenic Parliament from the Hellenic Government to 
allow a proper functioning Greek State, while also pursuing the complete 
independence of the Hellenic Courts.326 
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3. Citizenship 
As can be expected, the issue of Greek Citizenship arose once again in 2004 with 
the introduction of the Greek Nationality Code that stipulated Greek citizenship is 
granted to ethnic Greeks born to Greek parents (jus sanguinis) or ethnic Greeks 
born on Greek soil (jus soli).327 For example, Article 1, Excerpt 1 states “A child of a 
Greek father or a Greek mother acquires Greek Citizenship by birth.” 328 Greek 
citizenship was also granted to ethnic Greeks through the process of naturalisation 
so long as the individual has a parent or grandparent fulfilling jus sanguinis or jus 
soli, by enlisting in the Hellenic Armed Forces, or in certain cases, if an individual is 
born out of wedlock or is adopted as a minor, so long as in both cases the parent or 
guardian has Greek citizenship.329 Further, as Greece was new to joining the 
Schengen Area, it did not require passports for citizens of these countries entering 
and exiting its sovereignty.330 
The new Greek Nationality Code made it relatively easy, then, for ethnic 
Greeks to gain Greek Citizenship under the basis of ithageneia or nationality, 
whether it be Greeks from traditional areas of Greek settlement such as in Russia, 
Ukraine and Georgia, or Greeks from the Diaspora, with approximately 100,000 
granted in this period.331 The Greek Government, however, did not allow ethnic 
Greeks in Northern Epirus to gain Greek Citizenship as a means of preserving them 
as a minority in Albania, though this was changed in 2006 and resulted in 
approximately 150,000 of the total 300,000 Greeks in Northern Epirus applying or 
Greek Citizenship.332 However, while non-ethnic Greeks were mentioned in the 
Greek Nationality Code, apply for Greek Citizenship through Naturalization under 
the basis of ipikootita or citizenship, even if they were born and lived in Greece.333 
Under this arrangement, lived in Greece for an uninterrupted period of 10 years 
and if children, had to wait until they reached the age of 18 years.334  
While the Greek Nationality Code was introduced, the ways in which an 
individual could gain Greek Citizenship laid largely in the fact that they were ethnic 
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Greeks under the notion of ithageneia and granted full rights.335 A new trend to 
reinforce such a policy was how the Greek Nationality Code attempts to persuade 
ethnic Greeks of the Diaspora into applying for Greek Citizenship through 
Naturalization, which many did.336 Furthermore, despite the appearance of non-
Greeks in the document, Greek Citizenship was made virtually impossible for them 
to gain, while if an individual was part of the few that did, it was under the notion of 
ipikootita which meant they were still not granted full and equal rights to ethnic 
Greeks.337 Here, the indirect agenda was the hope that non-Greeks would not settle 
in Greece or would leave due to such discrimination.338 
 
4. Popular Sovereignty 
From 2001 onwards, it was clear that PASOK was losing its support from the Greek 
people which was reflected in the Greek Elections of 2004 which ND won with 
45.4% and 165 seats.339 In the following Greek Elections of 2007, ND proved to be 
dominant, although with a smaller percentage, and won again with 41.83% and 152 
seats.340 Local Elections were also held in 2004 and 2006 with ND gaining a majority 
of the votes in the former, particularly in Athens, Thessaloniki and Patra, and 
PASOK gaining a majority of the votes in the latter, again reflecting Greece's 
national elections.341 As members of the European Union, Greeks also participated 
in the European Elections of 2004 giving ND 43.02% and PASOK 34.03%, and again 
in 2009 giving PASOK 36.64% and ND 32.29%.342 
In the Greek Elections of 2004, however, and in accordance with the 
reinforced proportionality of the Greek political system, the 3% threshold was 
                                                            
335 Anagnostou, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, p. 18 
336 Kadianaki and Andreouli, Political Psychology, p.7 
337 Κonsta and Lazaridis, Journal of International Migration and Integration, pp. 375-380 
338 Christopoulos, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, pp. 10-15 
339 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, March 7, 2007 
http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/voul2004/el/index.htm and 
Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, September 17, 2007 
http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2007/pages/index.html (Accessed 12/12/2015) 
340 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, October 4, 2009 
http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2009/pages/index.html (Accessed 12/12/2015) 
341 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, 2002 
http://www.ypes.gr/el/Elections/CityElections/ResultsofElections/2002/ and 
Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, October 15, 2006 
http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/2006static/default.htm (Accessed 12/12/2015) 
342 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, June 13, 2004 
http://www.ypes.gr/el/Elections/ElectionsEuropeanParliament/ResultsofElections/2004/ and 
Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, June 7, 2009 
http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/e2009/pages/index.html (Accessed 12/12/2015) 
69 
 
introduced and used for the first time.343 In an attempt to secure stable 
governance, all political parties that wanted to be present in the Hellenic Parliament 
now had to gain 3% or more, otherwise, they would not be considered.344 In 
addition to the 3% threshold, the Greek Elections of 2007 saw changes to the 
percentage of what was considered a majority as well as to a new concession given 
to the political party that came first.345 If a political party wanted to gain a majority 
in the Hellenic Parliament, it had to gain 41.5% or greater of the vote which 
translates into 151 or greater of 300 seats, otherwise it had to form a coalition with 
another political party, whereas if the party passed this threshold, it was granted an 
additional 50 seats.346 
While stable governance was the goal that ensured Greek citizens voted 
without any political instability, the 3% threshold that was introduced discriminated 
against smaller political parties that want to form a base and enter the Hellenic 
Parliament.347 The 3% threshold thus acted as a tool of both ND and PASOK to 
ensure the majority of power in the Hellenic Parliament fluctuated between their 
dominance, with little concession given to smaller political parties, so that they 
indirectly guaranteed the Two-Party System.348 Furthermore, the extra 50 seats that 
were now awarded to the political party that came first, again always either ND or 
PASOK, guarantees that one of these two will always be granted the mandate to 
implement their programs.349 Despite the fact that the concept ensures a political 
party that passes the threshold is given extra seats to form a majority, the seats 
themselves have in no way whatsoever been approved by Greek citizens, and more 
importantly, disregard the numerous other political parties that may have gained a 
substantial amount of votes proportionally.350 
 
5. Political Parties 
Although Simitis had grown out of favour with his fellow MPs of PASOK, he 
remained a vehement individual in the Hellenic Parliament who distanced himself 
from the old ways of the past toward the future, best advocated in his policy of 
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modernisation.351 With the fall in popularity of Simitis as a result of the Stock 
Exchange Scandal, Kostas Karamanlis was rising through the ranks of New 
Democracy as the MP for Thessaloniki A from 1989 onwards.352 After New 
Democracy lost the Greek Elections of 1996, Karamanlis was elected to be its leader 
in 1997.353 As the nephew of the man who brought democracy to Greece, 
Karamanlis used Simitis' dwindling support for his own advantage and advocated 
New Democracy’s position of 're-establishing the Greek State'.354 
Within the Hellenic Parliament and within New Democracy, Karamanlis, both 
popular and unpopular to the Greeks, was nonetheless an intelligent individual that 
tried to relate with the everyday Greek, though not so much a strong political 
character with a future direction for Greece.355 Unlike his predecessors, Karamanlis 
was not the leader of New Democracy using the traditional hierarchical method but 
rather, as the leader of a team by working closely with his fellow MPs gaining their 
confidence through mutual respect as many of the MPs were older and more 
experienced.356 Karamanlis preferred to lead New Democracy with his most trusted 
and loyal MPs in their small inner circle where they would discuss their policies, 
giving them the freedom to operate in their respective areas while allowing 
Karamanlis to present them to his constituents.357 However, although Karamanlis 
was not a dominant leader, this did not prevent him from sidelining those who 
challenged his authority whereby his prudence allowed him to detect and deal with 
internal threats before they escalated.358 
As the leader of New Democracy and of the Greek Government, Karamanlis 
cannot be described as an individual with strong leadership skills.359 Whether his 
approach at working with his fellow MPs in a collective manner was intentional or 
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not for a more proactive leadership style, when Karamanlis took the reins, he was 
very much influenced by the mentioned older MPs who had served in New 
Democracy for almost a decade.360 These MPs, such as the current Greek President 
Prokopis Pavlopoulos, were able to persuade Karamanlis away from his 
'reestablishment', which they were not concerned with, toward a policy that 
reflected their own agenda.361 Karamanlis, understanding he could not take these 
individuals on due to their reputations as founding MPs post-Metapolitefsi under his 
uncle, avoided confrontations and allowed them to continue with their traditional 
way of doing politics acting as a mere puppet to avoid internal frictions or an early 
resignation.362 
 
6. Government 
The Simitis Government from 2001 onwards was concerned mainly with its 
dwindling support among the Greek people and its continuation of planning and 
preparing for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games.363 When the Karamanlis 
Government took office, it had to take over and complete all the preparations for 
the Olympic Games, only five months before they begun, albeit criticising the 
previous Simitis Government for unfinished buildings, cost overruns and secret 
arrangements that organised hidden debts.364 Understanding the importance of 
the Greek economy especially in regard to the Olympic Games, the Karamanlis 
Government swore to introduce a new economic policy for the country.365 The 
Karamanlis Government also concerned itself with promising to make structural 
changes to the administration of the Greek State that aimed at making the 
governance of society more effective.366 
Despite halving the Greek budget deficit to 2.6% through tax cuts, investment 
incentives and de-regulations, the Karamanlis Government was served with a 
Financial Audit in 2004 by the European Commission and asked to immediately 
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send financial data of its budget expenditure to Eurostat for analysis.367 Despite 
such measures, the Karamanlis Government lost face with the Greek people very 
quickly for its inaction during the Greek Fires of 2007 and 2009 when it did not act 
quick enough to put them out, killing 83 Greeks and injuring many more, destroying 
numerous homes and burning approximately one million hectares of Greek 
territory.368 In-between these events in 2008, the Karamanlis Government also 
faced a month of civil unrest and rioting in Athens and other major Greek cities 
when it protected a Police Officer who shot and killed 15-year-old Greek student 
and Anarchist Alexandros Grigoropoulos in Exarcheia.369 Prior to the onset of the 
Greek Economic Crisis, the Karamanlis Government also ignored the warnings 
coming from the Bank of Greece, and in an effort to avoid the issue, went adrift 
from the political scene, called the early Greek Elections of 2009 and resigned. 
Overall, it is not an understatement to argue that Greeks were not impressed 
by either of the Karamanlis Governments, mainly for their inability to fulfil pre-
election promises and the sheer amount of funds it spent on the Olympic Games 
that, with effective management, could have been used for better uses such as 
infrastructure.370 371 The Karamanlis Government became even more unpopular 
with Greeks, not so much because the Greek Fires of 2007 and 2009 occurred, but 
rather, because of its inability to put them out quick enough and offer substantial 
support to the citizens of the country who lost their homes and loved ones.372 While 
it was condemned, after the murder of Alexandros Grigoropoulos, the anger and 
outrage of the Greek people was endemic with a total loss of trust in the Greek 
System, particularly of the Karamanlis Government seen as the chief of the Hellenic 
Police who killed a 15-year-old boy, eventually leading to its downfall a few years 
later.373 Further, by completely ignoring the warnings of the Bank of Greece and not taking 
the initiative to resolve the economic woes of the country, Karamanlis’ abrupt resignation 
and abandonment gave way to the full blown Greek Economic Crisis. 
 
7. Checks and Balances 
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After substantial research into the career of Karamanlis as an MP of New 
Democracy of Thessaloniki A in the Hellenic Parliament, he is one of the very few 
MPs who did not mention the implementation of checks and balances into the 
Greek system.374 In the New Democracy Programme prior to the Greek Elections of 
2004, Karamanlis mainly advocated rhetoric against the policies of the previous 
PASOK Government under Simitis.375 In addition, prior to the Greek Elections of 
2007, Karamanlis continued such policies under New Democracy with checks and 
balances a void topic.376 In fact, even as Prime Minister, not once was the concept of 
checks and balances present in the Government Gazette.377 
Karamanlis, like most of the Prime Ministers post-1974, strongly believed in 
the centralisation of power.378 Although the centralisation of some power is 
necessary for the functioning of the Nation-State, in the case of Greece, it 
comprises of all power.379 It is witnessed in how Karamanlis and his top advisors 
exerted their influence over New Democracy from the hands of a few in a to- down 
pyramid.380 In addition, it is seen in the ways in which Karamanlis, along with his 
Cabinet, acted with respect to the functioning of the Greek Government.381 
While Karamanlis went by the pseudonym of Costas to distance himself from 
the old political guard that his uncle Konstantinos represented, he was an individual 
that was simply not interested in checks and balances.382 The result of having such 
an attitude thus led to and caused a considerable amount of issues and problems 
throughout his tenure as Prime Minister.383 In times of opportunity, Karamanlis, 
relying solely on his own political will, unfortunately, did not make the right and fair 
decisions that would have benefited Greece such as with the Vatopedi Scandal 
where he completely undermined the Greek Courts.384 In addition, in times of crisis, 
again relying solely on his own power, Karamanlis did not act in a timely fashion 
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and at times, did not act at all, which had numerous negative impacts on Greece 
such as the Greek Fires of 2007 and 2009.385 
 
8. Public Sector 
Prior to the Greek Elections of 2004, ND under Karamanlis promised that they 
would reform the Greek public sector so that it would be free from corruption.386 
The position of New Democracy was a direct attack on PASOK which ND believed 
ran the Greek State through its 'Seven Pests', the important one here being 
PASOK's grip on the civil service.387 However, once the Karamanlis Government was 
in office, it changed its rhetoric to rather than fighting corruption or the so-called 
public service pest through reforms, it would now simply decrease the public sector 
by selling assets belonging to the Greek State such as the Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organization (OTE) to private enterprises.388 By increasing 
privatisation in the country, the Karamanlis Government passed the responsibility 
of such public servants onto foreign organisations under the banner of increasing 
Greek competitiveness in the market, although now it was also not burdened with 
paying for their salaries, pensions and benefits of such a large number of public 
servants.389 
While New Democracy criticised PASOK, once the former took office, the 
Karamanlis Governments maintained its strong involvement throughout the state 
apparatus as well as the wider public sector, including both state assets and public 
servants.390 To no one’s surprise, New Democracy under Kostas utilised the 
structures of the Greek State using them as a kind of managerial machine to fulfil 
its own interests over the administration of the public sector, namely the 250,000 
public servants it hired seasonally on a preferential basis.391 This was further 
achieved through the aspirations of privatisation in the country which the 
Karamanlis Governments uniquely used to sustain the norm of control by the 
Greek State.392 OTE was a primary example whereby although the Karamanlis 
Government began its privatisation process, it maintained the Greek State's 
majority in its shareholdings by passing a law in 2007 that did not allow anybody 
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else apart from the Greek State to hold more than 20% of a Greek asset, thus 
maintaining a majority share in its already owned assets.393 
New Democracy's criticism of PASOK seems somewhat hypocritical as ND 
itself did not make any reforms to reverse one of the 'Seven Pests' or hold over the 
public sector.394 The hold that New Democracy had on the public sector gave the 
Greek Government a tool to use how and when it saw fit, such as when economic 
times proved to be difficult, it froze or reduced wages as opposed to when the 
economy was growing, it granted incentives.395 While New Democracy was 
responsible for certain privatisation efforts of state assets, the hold of 20% by the 
Greek Government made it difficult for private organisations to invest and make 
modern changes or improvements of their own.396 The difficulties these 
organisations faced with the Greek State delayed potential deals that would have a 
positive outcome on the Greek economy, left many in limbo and rendered others to 
abandon their offers in Greece altogether and seek opportunities elsewhere in the 
Balkans.397 
 
9. Security 
As a result of Greece’s numerous issues with its neighbours, mainly Turkey, the 
Greek Government continued to increase its military expenditure from 2001 
spending approximately four and a half to six billion euros annually or 
approximately 3% of GDP.398 Greece also maintained that it would remain an active 
member and uphold its obligations by participating in the various engagements of 
NATO and the UN. Domestically, the security of Greek and foreign citizens were 
improved when in 2002, the Hellenic Police captured leaders Alexandros 
Giotopoulos and Dimitris Koufodinas, as well as seventeen other members of the 
far-left terrorist organisation November 17 for a total of 2500 charges, including 
murder.399 The greatest task of the Hellenic Police, however, in collaboration with 
the Armed Forces, Fire Brigade and the National Intelligence Service, was the 
security of the Athens 2004 Olympics with a significant increase in Hellenic Police 
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responsible for public order, security and road duties using magnetic gates, thermal 
cameras, portable transceivers, dogs, vehicles and helicopters.400 
Although the Greek Government under Simitis responded and engaged with 
Turkey in ‘Dog Fights’ over the Aegean in response to its airspace violations, 
tensions escalated in 2006 when a Greek F-16 and Turkish F16 collided mid-air, 
killing the Greek pilot Costas Iliakis.401 402 Nevertheless, Greece was active in the 
Afghan War from 2001, Iraq War from 2003, Sudan War from 2005 and Lebanon 
War from 2006, as well as in the Rebellion in the FYR from 2001 – 2003, and finally, 
UN Missions in the Mediterranean from 2001 to prevent the smuggling of WMDs 
and in the Horn of Africa from 2003 to protect cargo ships from pirates. The 
arresting of Giotopoulos, Koufodinas and other N17 members significantly reduced 
the acts of terrorism in Greece committed by far-left groups with such measures 
acting as a deterrent against future groups.403 Further, the measures taken by the 
Hellenic Police regarding the Olympic Games, however, were viewed as extravagant 
as Greece spent a total of approximately one billion euros for security alone.404 
The money Greece spent on its military expenditure were nonetheless 
viewed as extravagant and wasted on the maintenance of bases, equipment and 
personnel, severely the development of the Greek military industry.405  
Furthermore, the sheer amount of money Greece spent on the Athens 2004 
Olympics Games, money which it did not have, would be one of the primary factors 
that crippled the Greek economy some years later.406 While the arrests of N17 
members reduced official acts of terrorism in Greece, it did not help the Hellenic 
Police stop Anarchists, mainly from Exarcheia in Athens, a prominent Anarchist 
area, from using political issues in the country as an excuse to riot and cause 
damage to Greek property.407 Further protests occurred, mainly from left wing 
citizens, who took to the streets on numerous occasions against Greece’s 
involvement in NATO and UN engagements, rendering them not a Greek problem, 
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particularly when Greece was unable to protect its sovereignty from the likes of 
Turkey.408 409 
 
10. Elites 
As the name indicates, Kostas Karamanlis is linked to the Karamanlis Dynasty that 
traces its ancestry to the Karamanlides of Asia Minor.410 Kostas is the nephew of the 
Konstandinos Karamanlis who returned democracy to Greece in 1974 with the 
Metapolitefsi.411 Kostas’ father, Alekos Karamanlis, a brother of Konstandinos, was 
not directly involved in Greek politics but did allow several secret political meetings 
to take place in his work office during the Junta.412 While most of Kostas’ family 
involved in Greek politics are active in the Karamanlis stronghold of Serres, Kostas 
expanded their reach by being active in the Thessaloniki A constituency.413  
As a man with strong family connections with the Karamanlis Dynasty, Kostas 
was indebted to be involved in a political scandal of some sort, and while many can 
be mentioned involving himself and MPs, the most prominent is the Vatopedi 
Scandal of 2008.414 Although it is uncertain when the scandal occurred, in 
September of 2008 new broke that a deal had been conducted between the 
Karamanlis Government and the Vatopedi Monastery in Mount Athos.415 It was 
reported that the two had agreed to trade low-value land belonging to the Vatopedi 
Monastery in exchange for high-value property belonging to the Greek State.416 
While the Greek State had sold such property for approximately 100 million euros, 
it was found that the real estimate was approximately 1 billion euros, and while the 
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deal was legitimate on paper, questions remained as to how such a large amount of 
money was unaccounted for.417 
It is evident that Karamanlis, in the same way as his predecessors, was very 
much like many in the Karamanlis Dynasty that has used their position within the 
Greek State for personal gain.418 While his uncle was a reputable man, there is no 
doubt the Karamanlis Dynasty has been involved, both prior to and post 1974, as 
well as during this period, with known and unknown scandals.419 The fact that the 
Vatopedi Scandal occurred during and with the Karamanlis Government is no 
surprise as Karamanlis himself has quoted participation in 'secret deals' being 
conducted behind closed doors.420 Such secret deals demonstrate how Karamanlis, 
as well as his close associates, are able to make a profit and in the case of Vatopedi, 
a profit that Karamanlis has kept hidden and a scandal that he has yet to be 
investigated for.421 
 
11. Church of Greece 
The Church of Greece begun 2001 with some positive steps toward the Greek State 
with Archbishop Christodoulos of Athens and All Greece blessing the Hellenic 
Genocide Petition Effort that urged that the Greek Government not to change Law 
2675/98 that wanted to remove the word 'genocide' when referring to the Hellenic 
Genocide of Asia Minor.422 That same year, in an attempt to defend the Greek State, 
Christodoulos forced Pope John Paul II who was visiting Greece for the first time to 
apologise for the Fourth Crusade and Sack of Constantinople in 1204, which he did, 
which is commemorated by the Church of Greece along with the Fall of 
Constantinople in 1453 annually.423 A year later in 2002, the Church of Greece 
exercised its right by declining a suggestion made by the Greek State that it should 
use Modern Greek in the Holy Liturgy, instead of maintaining the use of Koine 
Greek.424 Most importantly, however, in 2003, the Church of Greece was supported 
by the Greek State, under the guidance of Article 105 of the Greek Constitution, that 
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concreted the status of Mount Athos and its way of life to remain unchanged as 
part of the EU.425 
These moments of mutual cooperation, however, did not withhold the 
Church of Greece from organising protests, riots and petitions all over Greece in 
response to the Greek Government removing religious affiliation from Greek ID 
Cards and labelling globalisation a 'crime against humanity' for its role.426 In both 
2003 and 2006, the Church of Greece was also responsible for stopping the 
construction of a Mosque in Athens on the grounds that Greece was not yet ready 
for a Mosque.427 In 2007, the Church of Greece pressured the Greek State to 
reverse changes made to a Greek school textbook that questioned the role of the 
Orthodox Church in maintaining the Greek ethnos during the Tourkokratia.428 A year 
later, the Church of Greece also denounced a decision made by the Greek 
Government to introduce civil partnerships, labelling the law as a motivator of 
state-sanctioned prostitution.429 
In almost all cases mentioned above, it is evident the Church of Greece still 
believes itself to be the protector of the Greek ethnos as understood by and in 
accordance with Orthodox Christianity.430 Despite the fact that the Greek State 
employs the clergy of the Church of Greece, grants them tax exemptions and offers 
various benefits, the Church of Greece is still vehement on having a hold over the 
Greek State by ensuring it does not proceed with policies outside the realm of what 
it constitutions as truly part of the Greek ethnos.431 This is proven in the fact that 
when issues arise that are contrary to the image of Orthodox Greece, such as 
religious affiliation on state identification cards which would no doubt have 
Orthodoxy as a majority, it is the first to attack the Greek State through various 
mentioned means until its will is met.432 It is also proven in how the Church of 
Greece will go as far as disregarding articles of the Greek Constitution it perceives 
as against Orthodoxy Greece such as religious freedom and the protection of the 
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family, the former that would normally allow the construction of a mosque and the 
latter civil partnerships between for same-sex relationships.433 
 
12. Summary 
It can, therefore, be argued that the various institutions of the Greek State were 
explored from the period 2001-2008. The chapter began with the revisions that 
occurred to the Greek Constitution in 2001 under the Simitis Government and how 
these can be described as the most important in the country to date with changes 
to the separation of powers and improvements in citizen rights. Following this was 
a further look at Greece's citizenship debate which again proved to be solely 
between varying conditions for Greeks, both in Greece and the Diaspora, and non-
Greeks, in an effort to keep the country homogenous. As citizens who form the core 
of the democracy in the country, changes to the political system were explored, 
namely the introduction of the 3% threshold and 50-seat bonus used by political 
parties to manipulate the notion of popular sovereignty to their advantage. 
Furthermore, the chapter discussed Simitis' new rival in the Hellenic 
Parliament, Kostas Karamanlis, an individual that was popular within New 
Democracy for his name and ability to be influenced by older MPs. Nevertheless, 
the Karamanlis Governments which served for two terms were rather ambitious 
but lost favour with the Greek people for their inability to act in moments of 
importance. A prominent example of this inability is proven through Karamanlis’ 
view on checks and balances which he did not mention throughout his tenure, 
proving his allegiance to the old ways. In addition, the chapter explored the role of 
the Karamanlis Government in trying to portray itself with aspirations toward the 
privatisation of state assets while at the same time maintaining a high stake in 
them to prevent change. 
In terms of security, the Karamanlis Government was responsible for budget 
deficits both domestically in terms of the Olympic Games and on a foreign level in 
terms of Greece’s military expenditure. As per the norm in Greek politics, it was 
found that Karamanlis had obvious links with the Karamanlis Dynasty and as such, 
was involved in prominent scandals such as the Vatopedi Scandal whereby 
substantial funds disappeared. Finally, the Church of Greece was again mentioned 
in terms of how it interacted with the Greek State, interfering in matters relating to 
the Greek State when it felt its notion of the protector of the Greek ethnos was 
threatened, such as with allowing civil partnerships. It can, therefore, be argued 
that Greek institutions in the period of 2001-2008 can be described as progressing 
on a limited level in comparison to the period of 1986-2000.  
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Chapter 5: 2008 – 2016 
 
1. Context 
The period from 2009 - 2016 looks at the institutions of the Greek State from the 
onset of the Greek Economic Crisis. While the Greek Constitution has not been 
revised since 2001, proposals made by MPs of PASOK and ND in 2014 will be looked 
at, despite that these never came to realised. In terms of Greek citizenship, the 
period is and continues to be marked by the position of the Greek Government on 
Greeks citizens and non-Greeks arriving into Greece. However, the most important 
institution in this period is the popular sovereignty of Greek citizens and the new 
trend the economic crisis has had on this concept.  
Furthermore, the Hellenic Parliament saw the leadership of three new 
individuals, George Papandreou, Antonis Samaras and Alexis Tsipras, leaders of 
PASOK, ND and SYRIZA, respectfully. The Papandreou Government, Samaras 
Government and now SYRIZA Government to the Greek Economic Crisis, namely 
the memorandums and austerity measures, will be of pivotal focus since it begun.  
As a result of EU pressure, these governments also advocated of also implementing 
reforms that would target the deficiencies of the Greek system. In addition, the 
biggest area of both economic and social reform was the large Greek public sector 
that the previous PASOK Government and ND Government did not change, as well 
as that of SYRIZA that swore would remain free of change. 
Stemming away from the traditional security concerns from Turkey, in this 
period, the main security risk to Greece was the large influx of people, 
approximately over a million, crossing into Greece from Turkey. In a further direct 
result of the Greek Economic Crisis, Greece's elites have come into the spotlight 
with the revelation of the Lagarde List hinted at the extent to which Greece's 
wealthiest were significantly involved in tax evasion and corruption to which the 
Greek State did not act against. Finally, in regards to the Church of Greece, the issue 
of Greekness again arose with its involvement in state affairs. Once each of these 
institutions has been discussed, particularly in regards to the Greek Economic 
Crisis, a summary will follow on the overall period from 2009 - 2016. 
 
2. Constitution 
Although no changes have been made to the Greek Constitution since 2008, it is 
worth mentioning that in 2012, both ND and PASOK argued while important articles 
within it needed revision, there was no collective consensus as to which articles 
needed to be changed.434 Since the signing of the First Memorandum in 2010 by 
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PASOK and the Second Memorandum in 2012 by ND as a response to the Greek 
Economic Crisis, neither ND or PASOK were confident that they would not have the 
support of the Hellenic Parliament or a 2/3 majority in the matter.435 Nevertheless, 
SYRIZA has argued since 2015 that it openly wants a new Greek Constitution to be 
in force by 2021, a move that is forbidden.436 For example, Article 110, Excerpt 1 
states “The provisions of the Constitution shall be subject to revision with the 
exception of those which determine the form of government as a Parliamentary 
Republic and those of articles 2 paragraph 1, 4 paragraphs 1, 4 and 7, 5 paragraphs 
1 and 3, 13 paragraph 1, and 26.”437 
The reason MPs are not allowed to change such articles within the Greek 
Constitution as they are considered fundamental and at the heart of the democracy 
of the Greek State, such as its notion of being a Parliamentary Republic.438Further, 
these articles outline the fundamental powers of the legislative to the Parliament 
and President, powers of the executive to the Government and President and 
powers of the legislative to the courts.439 Nevertheless, as more and more 
parliamentarians have adopted the view that these articles need to be revised, 
particularly those referring to the separation of powers, they believe their popular 
sovereignty which is guaranteed in article 1 section 2 overrides article 110.440 Such 
parliamentarians have thus called for either the forbidden articles to thus be 
revised or that an entirely new constitution be written.441 
To date, many parliamentarians in the country, therefore, believe that while 
the Greek Constitution served its purpose in 1975, it is now outdated in the 
functioning of the Greek State, particularly as it has been unable to deal with the 
Greek Economic Crisis.442 The primary reason for this belief lies in the fact that such 
a significant amount of institutional problems are the direct result deficiencies 
found throughout many articles, both those untouched and revised in the past, of 
the constitution.443 Parliamentarians with this belief have recognised that this has 
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largely been because of the ambiguous language it uses such as conflicting terms 
or the lack of explanation regarding fundamental forms of governance such as the 
separation of powers.444 Furthermore, there is also the belief that a new Greek 
Constitution would demonstrate to the EU, on the seriousness on Greece’s part for 
integration and modernisation.445  
 
3. Citizenship 
For much of this period, Greece continued the policies of the previous years in 
regards to Greek Citizenship which made it relatively easy for ethnic Greeks to 
acquire it.446 However, two primary changes were made for non-Greeks in 2010 
whereby they, otherwise known as the 'Second Generation' were entitled to Greek 
Citizenship so long as they and a parent was born and lived in Greece for five 
years.447 Furthermore, changes were also made in 2010 to acquisition of Greek 
Citizenship by non-Greek EU citizens via naturalisation whereby they could apply 
for Greek Citizenship so long as they lived in Greece for five years and were 
competent in the Greek language and knowledge of Greek history as a means of 
demonstrating their Greek consciousness, despite that many were born and went 
to school in Greece.448 Finally, in 2015, those of the Second Generation were 
granted automatic Greek Citizenship under Articles 1 and 2 if they attained a 
“declaration due to birth and school attendance in Greece” or a “ declaration due to 
school or university attendance in Greece.”449 
However, as a result of the Greek Economic Crisis, the issue of Greek 
Citizenship has been brushed aside with the Greek State mainly focusing solely on 
Greek citizens, migrants and the status of refugees.450 While the majority of 
migrants seek to reach other parts of Europe, there are those who are stuck in 
Greece, both legal and illegal, who are unable to continue their journey mainly due 
to their financial circumstances.451 Successive Greek Governments have maintained 
a similar policy of trying to keep migrants out altogether through various means 
such as building a fence on the Greek-Turkish border while also excluding them 
from Greek society altogether by not offering them any rights with the hope that 
they would voluntarily leave, arguing that they simply cannot cater for such 
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people.452 However, when German Chancellor Merkel announced in 2015 that 
Germany would take in over 500,000 refugees, approximately 1,000,000 people 
from the Middle East started crossing from Turkey into the Greek islands, namely 
Lesbos, Chios and Samos, in an effort to pass through Greece to Germany.453 
Once the EU realised that it could not handle such a large influx of people, it 
begun to initiate a policy of closing its borders and in an agreement with Greece 
and Turkey, the former would house and process approximately 50,000 while the 
latter would accept those deported back from Greece, eventually to be resettled at 
a later date elsewhere in the EU. As Greece still does not have the resources for 
such a task, the SYRIZA Government, which initially only agreed to temporary 
placements, changed its policy and agreed with the EU that it would grant 
permanent asylum to 50,000 people.454 Although the exact number of processed 
people into Greece is unknown, the current 54,042 in the country waiting were 
described by Deputy Migration Minister Yannis Mouzalas as going to help with 
Greece's 'demographic problem’ as well as the decreasing number in its labour 
force.455 Unfortunately, the Greek State has not recognised the resentment of 
Greek citizens who feel their living conditions are continuously declining without 
any hope for change or assistance which has led to an exodus of Greek citizens, 
mostly graduates and professionals, elsewhere in Europe, North America or 
Oceania.456457 
 
4. Popular Sovereignty 
In the Greek Elections of 2009, George Papandreou of PASOK was appointed Prime 
Minister of the Papandreou Government winning 38.1% and 160 seats, serving until 
his resignation in 2011.458 After Papandreou's resignation, a temporary National 
Unity Government was formed under Lucas Papademos until the Greek Elections of 
2012 in May that resulted in no clear winner and the forming of a temporary 
Caretaker Government under Panagiotis Pikrammenos.459 In the second Greek 
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Elections of 2012 in June, Antonis Samaras of ND was appointed Prime Minister of a 
Coalition Government with PASOK, together winning 32.1% and 162 seats.460 With 
the failed Greek President Elections in 2015, the subsequent Greek Elections of 
2015 in January were held with Alexis Tsipras of SYRIZA being appointed Prime 
Minister winning 36.3% and 149 seats, and after internal strife, again winning the 
Greek Elections of 2015 in September with 35.5% and 145 seats, on both occasion 
forming a Coalition Government with the far-right Independent Greeks.461 
Nevertheless, since the beginning of the Greek Economic Crisis and the 
resulting actions of successive Greek governments, the turnout and abstained votes 
in 2009 were 70.95% to 29.05%, in May 2012 were 65.12% to 34.88% and in June 
2012 were 62.49% to 37.51%.462 Although in January 2015 the turnout and 
abstained were slightly higher with 63.62% to 35.38%, in September 2015 they were 
a shocking 56.57% to 43.43% with a further 6.41% of the former going to parties not 
in the Hellenic Parliament.463 In the same year, the SYRIZA Government was also 
responsible for holding the Greek Bailout Referendum on whether or not Greece 
should accept the deal proposed by the Troika.464 Dissatisfied with the Greek 
Government and Troika, and while the question was rather dubious, 61.31% of 
Greeks voted against the deal and 38.69% in favour.465 
While voting is in fact compulsory in Greece, the result of successive Greek 
governments not enforcing the notion has had a catastrophic impact on the Greek 
democratic system as since 2009, turnout and abstained votes have continued to 
decrease.466 In regards to the Greek Elections of 2015 held in September, this is 
particularly alarming as only 56.57% or approximately half of eligible Greeks 
voted.467 The legitimacy of the SYRIZA Government to date has also been 
questioned as if the percentages of invalid and blank ballots and parties that did 
not enter the Hellenic Parliament are included, comprising 2.42% and 6.41% 
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respectfully, the Greek Government was formed from only 47.74%.468 Furthermore, 
the fact that the SYRIZA Government did not act on the results of the Greek 
Referendum of 2015 indicates that Greeks are dissatisfied with their politicians and 
have lost faith in taking part in a political process toward no end.469 
 
5. Political Parties 
George Papandreou became the leader of PASOK in 2004 and Official Opposition 
Leader until 2009 when he became Prime Minister, claiming his leadership of 
PASOK was and would continue to be the result of a break from traditional dynastic 
politics.470 The next Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras, became the leader of New 
Democracy in 2009, pledging that as Prime Minister he would make both 
ideological and organisation reforms within New Democracy.471 However, the 
biggest change occurred with Alexis Tsipras, who became the youngest leader of 
SYRIZA in 2008 at 33, an MP for Athens A in 2009, followed by the Official 
Opposition Leader in 2012.472 As of 2015, Tsipras is the first and current Prime 
Minister that is not from the traditional centre-right ND and centre-left PASOK, but 
rather, from the far-left SYRIZA that he pledged would rid the Greek State of the old 
in order to win the future, elegantly expressed through their motto of 'hope is 
coming.'473 
Papandreou was initially popular with PASOK due to his family lineage, 
however, as he immediately had to face the Greek Economic Crisis, he quickly 
became very unpopular amongst his fellow MPs for his pro-EU leadership style and 
policies, ultimately resigning in 2011.474 His successor, Samaras, was also a popular 
leader of ND, running the party so that he maintained a majority status at all times 
which was achieved by expelling those who questioned his party line decisions such 
as Dora Bakoyianni in 2010.475 Tsipras is unique in that he was successful with 
                                                            
468 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, 2015 
469 Ministry of Interior, Greek Referendum, 2015 
470 Hellenic Parliament, George Papandreou, 2009 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/vouleftes/george-papandreou/ (Accessed 12/05/2016) 
471 Hellenic Parliament, Antonis Samaras, 2012 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/vouleftes/antonis-samaras/ (Accessed 12/05/2016) 
472 Hellenic Parliament, Alexis Tsipras, 2015 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/vouleftes/alexis-tsipras/ (Accessed 12/05/2016) 
473 Hellenic Parliament, Alexis Tsipras, 2015 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/vouleftes/alexis-tsipras/page2/ (Accessed 12/05/2016) 
 
 
474 S. Kouvelakis, ‘The Greek Cauldron’, New Left Review, Vol. 72, No. 17, 2011, p. 17 
475 H. Mylonas, ‘Greece’, European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook, Vol. 52, No. 1, 
2015, pp. 127-128 
87 
 
SYRIZA for his populist mandate and overall leadership of a coalition of various 
democratic political parties.476 However, in 2014, Tsipras changed his leadership 
style when SYRIZA was voted with 74% to be the sole leader of a unitary party which 
gave him the further opportunity to expand on his populist agenda.477 
Papandreou was the Prime Minister and Leader of PASOK in a time with 
unforeseen circumstances and as a result, made the best possible choice or the 
lesser of two evils by resigning as Prime Minister which kept his principles intact 
rather than answering for the misdemeanours of previous PASOK Governments.478 
On the other hand, Samaras, who had the support of ND, seems to have made the 
wrong decision by arrogantly trying to have his MP Stavros Dimas elected as 
President which, after failing on two attempts, left the current President to dissolve 
the Hellenic Parliament and call for elections.479 Tsipras, who started as a strong 
leader of SYRIZA, faced a minor setback in 2015 when MPs within SYRIZA led by 
Panagiotis Lafazanis were responsible for an internal rebellion, causing Tsipras to 
briefly resign and hold elections.480 Although Tsipras was re-elected, he has been 
known to maintain power by reshuffling his Cabinet on two occasions to remove 
those who disagreed with him, replacing MPs who did not uphold his policies and 
dealing with internal dissidents through a vote of confidence and a snap election.481 
 
6. Government 
With the exception of a proposed referendum by Papandreou on whether Greece 
should accept the Troika's bailout package, the Papandreou Government 
acknowledged it needed to work with the Troika in solving Greece's economic 
problems.482 Despite Samaras’ error of holding Presidential Elections in December 
2014 as opposed to the usual February of 2015 and in the middle of bailout talks, 
the Samaras Government was also complacent with the Troika regarding the Greek 
Economic Crisis that was to be dealt with as quickly as possible without considering 
the effects it would have.483 On the other hand, the SYRIZA Government took a 
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different approach towards the Troika, stating that it would never agree to another 
memorandum or austerity measures that undermined the Greek people.484 Tsipras, 
as well as many of his MPs such as Yannis Varoufakis, were somewhat hostile 
toward the Troika in their public statements, meetings and speeches, constantly 
attacking mainly the EU and German Chancellor Merkel for their oppressive and 
unfair policies.485 
The Papandreou Government was first to attempt a solution by signing the 
First Austerity Package, Second Austerity Package, First Memorandum and 
subsequent Third Austerity Package in 2010, and the Fourth Austerity Package and 
Fifth Austerity Package in 2011, all of which aimed at saving 43.6 billion in exchange 
for 107.3 billion to stop Greece from going bankrupt in 2010.486 Despite the fact 
that Samaras fiercely criticised Papandreou for his agreements in a pre-election 
speech at the Zappeion, once the Samaras Government was in power, it too 
attempted to resolve the crisis by signing the Sixth Austerity Package, Second 
Memorandum, and Seventh Austerity Package in 2012, Eighth Austerity Package in 
2013 and Ninth Austerity Package in 2014 which gave Greece 164.5 billion in 
exchange for further austerity to stop the country from defaulting on its debt.487 
While the Tsipras Government was elected on the very premises that it would never 
agree to such documents, it eventually succumbed out of fears of a Grexit from the 
EU and total economic devastation, signing the Tenth Austerity Package, Eleventh 
Austerity Package, Third Memorandum and Twelfth Austerity Package in 2015 
which gave Greece 86 billion in exchange for the harshest austerity to date.488 In 
2016, the SYRIZA Government agreed with the European Commission for the 
implementation of a Thirteenth Austerity Package.489 
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With the exception of wealthy Greek citizens who comprise one percent of 
the population, the result of such measures has had an impact on the majority of 
Greek citizens in the form of a humanitarian crisis.490 Without a substantial amount 
of money coming in due to the shrinking of Greek GDP by 24% in six years, many 
Greeks have had difficulties in sustaining their living style and have not been able to 
pay for their electricity and water bills, and basic needs such as food with reports 
that approximately 200,000 Greek children go to school hungry and faint as a 
result.491 Greeks are also now faced in dealing with the effects to Greek social 
services as a result of cuts with the most significant occurring to the health care 
system that is short of doctors and nurses, lacks equipment and space, and has 
skyrocketed in prices for services.492 With little help from the Greek State and the 
inability of family and friends to offer assistance, one in four Greeks now lives 
below the poverty line with thousands of other Greeks becoming homeless.493 
 
7. Checks and Balances 
In addition to economic reforms and as a result of pressure from the EU, the PASOK 
Government also made promises that it would make extensive political reforms, 
though none of these came to be realised as Papandreou resigned.494 Samaras, his 
predecessor, also argued in line with the EU and agreed that changes need to be 
made to the Greek system as Greece’s extensive economic problems were the 
result of political mismanagement by the Greek political class.495 In an effort to 
break Greece from the past, SYRIZA maintained its hard line mandate that it would 
implement either new articles and legislation within the Greek Constitution or new 
Greek laws that specifically targeted the separation of powers.496 More specifically, 
SYRIZA was vehement that it would address the deep and ongoing problems of the 
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Greek political class that all political parties have become accustomed to such as 
clientelism, nepotism and privileges.497 
Although the EU continues to offer assistance to Greece, the implementation 
of checks and balances into the country has been largely resisted by PASOK and 
ND.498 While much was not expected from ND and PASOK, there was promise with 
SYRIZA, backed by public support and its mandate, that change would occur with 
their tenure.499 Although the SYRIZA Government made strong pre-election 
promises at changing the system, it has spent the majority of its time talking about 
reforms without actually making any concrete proposals with calendar end 
dates.500 In fact, even when pressure is applied on the SYRIZA Government to 
pursue its ‘hope toward a better future’, it has become reluctant with Tsipras and 
MPs simply filling the positions of PASOK and ND.501 
The difference between PASOK and ND in regards to the wishes of the EU 
was so long as the former implemented economic reforms, the latter was not 
overly concerned with the extent to which they implement social reforms.502 
However, the concern of the EU arose when Tsipras and SYRIZA began questioning 
the economic reforms agreed to by PASOK and ND such as with former Finance 
Minister Yanis Varoufakis who continuously ridiculed the Troika under the banner 
of idealistic yet unrealistic alternatives such as threats of default in exchange for 
further funds.503  Once Tsipras and SYRIZA changed their tone toward the Troika by 
removing Varoufakis and finally agreeing to realistic economic reforms, SYRIZA 
used this notion to maintain the status quo by being absorbed into the lavish yet 
fragmented Greek system that they promised to change.504 Although the EU still 
does not fully trust the Tsipras Government, the two are on good terms, with his 
main foe now being the Greeks themselves who, as a result of SYRIZA’s broken 
promises, only give Tsipras approximately 29% and SYRIZA less than 20% of 
support.505 
 
8. Public Sector 
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Papandreou was careful with his language in regards to the Greek public sector and 
promised that under PASOK, public servants would not face financial cuts to wages 
or to their employment, amplified by the slogan at the time lefta uparxoun or there 
is money.506 Samaras was similar in his approach but rather than discussing public 
servants directly, he always made statements that ND would only reform and make 
changes to the public service itself, never referring to the individual due to strong 
reactions from Greek Unions.507 Prior to becoming Prime Minister, Tsipras 
promised that SYRIZA would not consider nor even negotiate the jobs of Greek 
public servants in its discussions with the Troika.508 Tsipras went so far as to make 
bold statements that under SYRIZA, no Greek public servant would lose his or her 
job or benefits and that those who had under PASOK and ND would be rehired.509 
However, despite their rhetoric, it was inevitable that the large Greek public 
would be a focus point of reform with the starting point being cuts to public-owned 
companies, ministries and municipalities.510 Without including cuts to pensions, 
increases in tax and the implementation of capital controls, the Greek Government, 
in accordance with the Troika, agreed to dismiss hundreds of thousands of public 
servants, many of whom did not receive a severance payment.511 For those who 
were still employed, the Greek Government first agreed to freezes in public servant 
salaries, followed by a 7%, 3%, 30%, 22% and 30% cut in their salaries, 
respectively.512 In addition, the Greek Government also made a 10%, 12%, 30% and 
8% cut to bonuses including annual and sick leave, overtime and work-related 
travel, all of which were eventually cancelled until further notice.513 
The closure of businesses owned by the Greek government and dismissal of 
public servants led to a sharp rise in unemployment in the country from 10% in 
2009 to 25% in 2015.514 Those still employed by the Greek State were outraged that 
they were now expected to work with such a low salary, next to no bonuses and the 
threat of further freezes to their salaries.515 As a result, The Union of Greek Civil 
Servants (ADEDY) has accused the practices of the Greek Government as a breach 
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of the workers’ rights of public servants and in an effort to demonstrate their 
dissatisfaction, is continuously active in organising various protests around the 
country.516 
The Greek Government has been unable to deal with these protests as many of 
them have crippling effects on Greek society such as Greece’s Public Power 
Company (DEH) that protested cuts by turning the electrical power on and off in 
cycles until a compromise was found, leaving many Greeks without power.517 
 
9. Security 
In addition to Greece's ongoing security threat from Turkey vis-à-vis their numerous 
issues and its high military expenditure in response to such a threat, Greek security 
focused mainly on the European Migrant Crisis that begun in 2015.518 Since that 
time, over a million people from the Third World have crossed, and continue to do 
so, from Turkey into Greece’s Aegean Islands such as Chios, Kos, Lesbos and 
Kastellorizo with the hope they will reach Europe’s rich countries such as Germany, 
France and the UK.519 Despite Greece’s best efforts, the European Migrant Crisis has 
been a fundamental security issue for the Greek Government as from the onset, it 
was unsuccessful in recording the details of such a large number of people entering 
its territory.520 While the majority of people have passed through Greece, the Greek 
Government is still unaware of who exactly passed, where they are from, what their 
intentions are and how many are still in the country, both accounted and not 
accounted for.521 
Greece’s concerns stem from the fact that Turkey, who has although agreed 
with the EU to stem the flow, follows the Ozal Doctrine that states Turkey does not 
need to make war with Greece but rather, will ‘finish them off’ through 
demographical changes by sending a few ‘million illegal immigrants’.522 In an 
attempt to keep people from crossing, Greece has increased the presence of the 
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Hellenic Police and the EU’s Frontex on the Greek-Turkish Border, accompanied by 
a 12km fence on a section of the Evros river and the recent inclusion of NATO 
patrolling the Aegean Sea.523 For those that still manage to cross the border, Greece 
adopted Operation Xenios Zeus that gave authority to the Hellenic Police to search 
and deport people in the country deemed to be illegal.524 Despite these measures, 
while the flow of people has slowed down, both the EU and Greece have 
questioned whether Turkey has ulterior motives as it still allows people to cross 
into Greece.525 
Although the SYRIZA Government should be commended for its 
humanitarianism, its subsequent open-border policy has resulted in the fear that a 
terrorist attack may occur in Greece.526 Once the EU realised such a large number 
of people was not feasible and adopted a closed border policy, Greece was still 
responsible for the current 54,042 people and unknown amount of undocumented 
people in its borders held in 'Hot Spots' and new 'Refugee Camps.'527 It is amongst 
these people that the Hellenic Police are uncertain as to whether or not terrorists 
may be hiding as was realised with the Paris attacks in 2015 whereby some of the 
perpetrators crossed through Greece.528 Their resentment toward Greece is 
increased as a direct result of the conditions that these people live in within the Hot 
Spots and Refugee Camps such as a lack of basic needs, no sanitation and 
overcrowding.529 
 
10. Elites 
George Papandreou, son of former two-time Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou 
and grandson of former three-time Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou, is also 
part of the Papandreou Dynasty and like most, started his career as an MP in the 
Papandreou-dominated region of Achaea.530 His rival and close friend Antonis 
Samaras, the two of which were roommates at Amherst College, is the son of Dr 
Konstantinos Samaras and nephew of MP George Samaras from the prominent 
Samaras Family of Messenia where Antonis also started his political career as an 
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MP.531 The latest Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, is the son of Pavlos Tsipras, a big 
contractor of public works and known collaborator of the Junta 1967-1974.532 
Nevertheless, while Tsipras comes from a prominent and wealthy family, he started 
his career in known leftist suburbs of Athens such as Nea Ionia with the KKE and 
Exarcheia with Synaspismos.533 
It is no surprise, however, that Papandreou and Samaras have links with 
Greeks found on the Lagarde List that outlines the extent to which such individuals 
are involved in tax evasion, embezzlement and the like.534 After Papandreou 
resigned as Prime Minister, Greek news reported that during his tenure, his mother 
Margaret Papandreou deposited 550 million euros into the Swiss HSBC Bank.535 In 
addition, Samaras was at the forefront when his close advisor Stavros Papastavros 
and MP Georgios Voulgarakis of ND were found to be on the Lagarde List for tax 
evasion and embezzlement.536 Tsipras, who spoke for months of purging the Greek 
State of these individuals and holding them accountable for their actions, is also 
closely linked with businessman Athanasios Martinos on the Lagarde List, spending 
time with the man at his villa on extended holidays throughout the summer 
months.537 
While the Lagarde List and other lists prove the dishonesty and immorality of 
these individuals, and that the problem of tax evasion amongst Greece’s elites does 
exist, it cannot be used in the courts of law and as such, MPs are unwilling to 
investigate and bring to justice those involved.538 Although there have been 
instances where certain individuals with links to Papandreou, Samaras, Tsipras or 
other MPs have been arrested or charged, these have not resorted to any end.539 In 
the case of former Finance Minister Giorgos Papakonstantinou and former Defence 
Minister Yiannis Sbokos both were acquitted and in the case of and former Deputy 
Interior Minister Leonidas Tzanis and businessman Vlassis Kambouroglou, both 
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were found dead prior to their trial.540 In order to maintain the status quo, MPs use 
their political positions to avoid combatting tax evasion as a whole and in order to 
maintain public face, will prosecute a few MPs in an attempt to present the issue as 
a minority problem, such as with former Defence Minister Akis Tsochatzopoulos 
who was charged with various economic scandals and given a prison sentence of 20 
years.541 
 
11. Church of Greece 
Relations between the Greek State and the Church of Greece remained somewhat 
positive throughout this period with the latter reinforcing its leadership status of 
the Greeks such as in 2012 when Metropolitan Mentzelopoulos of Athens claimed 
the Athens Mosque was not essential as most Muslims in the country were not 
citizens.542 This position was reiterated a few years later when the Church of Greece 
spoke out against new Anti-Racism Law that targeted Greeks, claiming the laws 
were a breach of the freedom of speech of the overwhelming Greek majority in a 
‘non-multi-ethnic’.543 In an effort to maintain the status quo of an Orthodox-
majority Greece, Archbishop Ieronymos II of Athens stated in 2015 that Europe, 
particularly because of its involvement in the Middle East, was responsible for the 
refugees and not debt-ridden Greece.544 In order to ensure its power hold, the 
Church of Greece, in the same year, successfully persuaded the SYRIZA 
Government, particularly the Minister of Culture, Education and Religious Affairs 
Aristides Baltas, to not proceed with the separation of church and state.545 
The Church of Greece, however, did not prevent itself from attacking Greek 
citizens throughout this period, particularly those part of the LGBT community.546 
The attacks began in 2012 with the controversial play Corpus Christi that depicted 
Jesus and the Apostles as homosexuals with the Church organising protests outside 
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Theatre Chytirio in Athens labelling the event a blasphemy.547 A few years later in 
2014, Archbishop Ieronymos II of Athens spoke out against the Anti-Racism Law 
that recognised same-sex unions in Greece, labelling the document as a means of 
trying to alter ‘Christian’ Greece.548The following year, Archbishop Ieronymos II 
slammed cohabitation agreements that granted members of the LGBT community 
similar rights to married Greeks so long as they lived together, calling them a poor 
imitation of marriage.549 
As this was the first time in its history that Greece has been governed by the 
far-left SYRIZA Government, the Church of Greece has been considerably active, 
particularly from 2015 onwards, in coming to the aid of the Greek ethnos when 
detrimental issues are raised.550 Despite the fact that for the time being, the 
separation between state and church is not on the agenda, the very future prospect 
of such an idea renders the Church of Greece in a difficult position, namely the fate 
of its clergy employed as public servants and its status of paying little to no tax. 551 
As the Church of Greece obviously feels threatened, it has attempted to maintain its 
status quo by flexing its muscles against the SYRIZA Government through attacks 
against its left-wing policies, namely those regarding the LGBT community.552 By 
doing so, the Church of Greece presents such policies, as well as those who 
implement them, as perverting away from what constitutes a true sense of 
Greekness with the hope that Greeks will become so dissatisfied that they will elect 
a more conservative political party sensitive to its case.553 
 
12. Summary 
It can, therefore, be concluded that since the onset of the Greek Economic Crisis, 
most institutions of the Greek State from 2009 – 2016 have faced their biggest 
challenges. Despite the proposals made by MPs of PASOK and ND, as well as 
various other parliamentarians that the Greek Constitution be revised or a new one 
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be written, it can be argued that these were simply proposals in name only with the 
current leadership not addressing the issue. While the Greek Government made 
concessions towards the Second Generation, the issue of Greek citizenship was 
once again a matter of dispute between Greeks and non-Greeks, and compounded 
by the economic crisis, has led to the former to leave their country and those of the 
latter enter it due to the ongoing mass arrival of people from the Third World. In 
addition to Greeks leaving the country, the popular sovereignty of Greek citizens 
has also been dealt a blow with the turnout and abstained votes continuously 
decreasing, an unfortunate reality that will continue to be present in future 
elections until the Greek Government addresses the needs of citizens. 
These governments were led by Papandreou and Samaras, and now Tsipras, 
all of whom, despite their ideological differences, can be described as ineffective 
leaders of their parties. Furthermore, these leaders, once in power as Prime 
Ministers of their respective governments, can also be described as effectively 
responding to the Greek Economic Crisis as their agreed memorandums and 
austerity measures have had detrimental effects on the Greeks rather than 
repairing the Greek economy. In addition, the promises made by the Papandreou 
Government and Samaras Government at political reforms fell through with no 
actions taken, and as for the most vocal and far-left Tsipras Government, its tone 
completely reversed as SYRIZA too became absorbed in the system. This pattern 
was also evident when it came to the Greek public service which, although 
progressive reforms, was hit the hardest with reforms that severely affected Greek 
workers rather than changing the paradigms of the institution itself. 
Despite Turkey's involvement and the influx of people being an EU problem, 
in the case of Greek security, the problem is not so much the people themselves 
but rather, the inability due to Greece's finances to properly build a functioning 
facility and process these people humanely while preventing would-be terrorists. In 
the case of Greek elites, it is again no surprise that politicians were involved with or 
have links with such individuals and any attempt at prosecuting those on the 
Lagarde List will not occur as the benefit to individuals such as Papandreou, 
Samaras and now Tsipras outweighs that of justice. As one of the most powerful 
institutions in the country, the Church of Greece demonstrated it has its own 
understanding of who is and who is not a ‘Greek’ which was exemplified in its 
attacks against the LGBT community, highlighting its nationalistic and conservative 
outlook. It is, therefore, evident that while the Greek Government has made the 
right steps toward some Greek institutions from 2009 - 2016, there are others 
where significant work still needs to be done.  
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Chapter 6: Future of Greece 
 
1. Context 
Although Greek institutions are in need of reform, it must be noted that Greece has 
come a long way since its establishment in 1821. While the Greeks have a long 
history spanning thousands of years identified through their Hellenism, the Greek 
Nation-State is still relatively young at only 195 years. For much of this time, the 
Greek Nation-State has been faced with numerous moments of political instability. 
An example of this has been the National Schism between the Greeks themselves, 
the most persistent being what model Modern Greece should follow, that of 
Ancient Greece or Medieval Greece, two completely different civilisations. 
More importantly, it has been faced with periodic periods of conflict and war. 
An example of this is from 1912 to 1923 where Greece was involved in the Balkan 
Wars, WWI, WWII, Asia Minor Catastrophe and Hellenic Genocide, 11 years of war. It 
has therefore only been since the Metapolitefsi or return of democracy in 1975 that 
Greece has had time to breathe. Realistically, this has only left Greece with 41 years 
to determine how Greek institutions will develop and evolve under its democracy. 
Considering the Greeks did not experience the Industrial Revolution, 
Renaissance or Enlightenment to the extent of other Europeans, their current 
predicament can be described as mainly positive with work to be done. With the 
right mind-set and a high level of optimism, it is important for Greeks to think 
amongst themselves about where they seriously want Greece to be situated over 
the next few years. With real action, Greeks could reach their full potential and 
transform Greece into a fully-fledged democracy. Through such a philosophy, 
suggestions have been made as to what solutions Greek politicians could adopt in 
order to reform the malfunctions of Greek institutions.554 
 
2. Constitution 
At present, the current SYRIZA Government is discussing the prospect of holding a 
referendum on future constitutional revisions, namely those regarding election law 
and those regarding the Greek President. Their goal is to introduce a simpler form 
of proportional representation, cancelling the 50-seat bonus to the political party 
that comes first, granting the Greek President more powers and allowing Greek 
citizens to elect the Greek President directly. Nevertheless, while the current 
constitution served its purpose in 1975, after years of turbulence, it is clear that 
Greece needs a new constitution. It should also be outlined that the Greek State is 
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solely based on the rule of law and not any religion, thus removing the Church of 
Greece and overall Greek Orthodox Church as the "prevailing religion". 
Part one should firstly describe the type of government that is best suited to 
the Greek political system, in this case, a parliamentary democracy with the semi-
presidential system. Part two regarding the rights of Greek citizens should be 
revised and updated to the standards of the EU and international law. Part three 
should outline how the Greek State is to be effectively organised and how it will 
function. Finally, as per the current constitution, part four should be put in place 
outlining the rules and regulations for revising the constitution, though without 
article restrictions and time limits. 
In such a system with a mix between a parliamentary democracy a semi-
presidential system, with greater powers to the Greek President, the effective 
governance of the country is ensured. It should be emphasised here that no matter 
the religion, sexual orientation, disability, and so on of each and every Greek citizen, 
all will be treated fairly and equally under the law such as recognising and granting 
secular marriage certificates for two adults, regardless if for two heterosexuals or 
two homosexuals, while also recognising religious certificates. The administration 
of the Greek State should mainly target the administration of Greek regions, the 
separation of powers and the application of checks and balances which are 
discussed further below. Finally, the ability to revise the new constitution without 
any restrictions will guarantee Greek democracy can evolve with the modern 
world.555 
 
3. Citizenship 
Since 1821, it is evident that the Greek State has pursued an indirect policy that 
seeks to keep the majority of citizens ethnic Greeks. However, with the growing 
amount of people crossing into its borders, if Greece wishes to maintain a 
homogenous society, which most Greeks support, then the Greek Government 
must enforce a crystal clear Greek Nationality Code. A solution for Greece would be 
to re-write the Greek Nationality Code while taking into strong consideration the 
successful Japanese model that includes the notions of jus sanguinis, jus matrimonii 
and to a lesser extent jus soli. Further, it would also attempt to close the historical 
long divisions between Greeks, and Greeks with non-Greeks, such as autochthonous 
and heterochthonous, ethnos and genos, homogenis and allogenis and ithageneia and 
ipikootita. 
The first, jus sanguinis, should be the granting of Greek citizenship to ethnic 
Greeks who are born in Greece to an ethnic Greek parent. The second, jus 
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matrimonii, should be the granting of Greek citizenship to ethnic Greeks who are 
born in the Diaspora to an ethnic Greek citizen. The third, jus soli, should be the 
granting of Greek citizenship to non-ethnic Greeks such as the Arvanites, 
Aromanians and Jews who have been born in Greece to non-ethnic Greek parents 
but have been fully absorbed into Greek society. Finally, jus soli should be the 
granting of Greek citizenship to non-ethnic Greeks who have been born in Greece 
to non-ethnic Greek parents, such as the recent refugees, once certain 
requirements have been fulfilled. 
The Greek Nationality Code should openly outline that Greek citizenship will 
not be granted to anyone not mentioned above that have not been born in Greece. 
While such a policy may seem extreme, the concepts of jus sanguinis, jus matrimonii 
and jus soli in this regard are guaranteed under international law. With 
multiculturalism being a declared failure in Europe, Greece must, therefore, ensure 
the future of the country by sustaining an ethnic Greek majority and more 
importantly, maintaining its strong links with its thriving Diaspora. However, as a 
member of the international community, Greece must also have measures put in 
place to fulfil its international obligations, particularly for those born in its 
territory.556 
 
4. Popular Sovereignty 
It is clear that the Greek Government is at a crisis point with its citizens who simply 
do not trust and have lost all faith in the authorities. In an effort to reconnect itself 
with Greek citizens, the Greek Government must enforce the already legal 
compulsory elections in the country. This will no doubt help with increasing the 
turnout of voters. However, a problem that can arise out of this situation is an even 
higher amount of abstained, invalid or blank votes. 
In an effort to reverse this trend, the Greek Government must start delivering 
on their promises to the Greek people, particularly when they say one thing and 
once in power, do the complete opposite. The most recent example of this was 
demonstrated in the Greek Referendum 2015 held by the SYRIZA Government. 
While the question itself directly asked whether Greeks supported the next bailout 
agreement, many have speculated that the question itself indirectly asked whether 
Greece should still be part of the EU. Regardless, the Greek Government did not 
respect the result of the referendum and it is such decisions that have caused a rift 
between the Greek State and Greek citizen. 
In an effort to close the gap, the Greek Government could perhaps 
implement a form of direct democracy through referendums, public dialogues and 
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open petitions that involves citizens and more so their direct opinion regarding 
important issues. For example, with most Greeks conflicted as to whether or not 
they want to be in the EU, the Greek Government should hold a referendum, 
similar to that in the UK, and simply ask its citizens the question ‘Do you want to be 
part of the EU?’ with a yes or no answer. However, as all MPs have a parliamentary 
responsibility as the representatives of Greek citizens, such a position should be 
utilised, with the absence of political games, to advocate to Greek citizens the 
position they believe is in their best interests. For example, while such a question 
could be asked, the Greek Government should inevitably communicate to Greek 
citizens that in the case of a no vote, such a scenario will have severe and long 
effects, and in the case of a yes vote, such a scenario will have mild and short 
effects, to which the outcome of both will be respected.557 
 
5. Political Parties 
Greek political parties who enter the Hellenic Parliament are in dire need of reform 
and modernization. The culture of having a ‘leader’ needs to be phased out and 
replaced with the culture of electing the most qualified and experienced individuals 
to lead political parties based on a party program. This is where the Greek Ministry 
of Interior must establish a separate Hellenic Elections Commission that is solely 
responsible for elections. This organisation would have two main tasks, the 
registration of political parties and the enforcement of the rules and regulations 
they must adhere too. 
The first step in the process of registering political parties should be the 
creation of their name, logo and most importantly, their ideas and beliefs, so long 
as they do not break the law such as hate speech. They must then be required to 
form a party committee of individuals who are responsible, in accordance with the 
law, of writing a formal party constitution. Prospective political parties must then 
hold an inaugural meeting where the party leadership and running members are 
elected in secret through a formal process, allowing a sense of transparency 
between individuals to occur. When positions have been filled, the party must then 
be required to gain 1000 members from registered citizens. 
Once this has been achieved, the party should be required to send all 
relevant information and proof of documentation to the Hellenic Elections 
Commission in an official application form for revision in accordance with the law. If 
approved and to ensure the political party remains accountable at all the, it should 
be subject to a trial period, must maintain over 1000 members and adhere to 
electoral rules and regulations in its pursuit for office. If declined, the Hellenic 
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Elections Commission should send a letter to the party outlining why the party was 
rejected and if and how it can re-apply once adjustments have been made or given 
the choice to appeal the decision. This policy should be applied to all political 
parties, both new and current, to ensure a level of equality and professionalism 
across the board and the complete removal of the leadership culture.558 
 
6. Government 
With the ongoing Greek Economic Crisis, it is imperative that both the current 
Greek Government as well as those of the future focus primarily on adopting and 
enforcing a policy that can that address its various governance problems. Greece 
must, therefore, adopt a serious plan to phase out the ongoing cronyism, statism, 
nepotism, clientelism, corruption, regulated professions or ‘closed shops’, and 
waste and red tape problems that run deep within the Greek political system. While 
the old way has proven to be unsustainable, Greece must replace its bad habits to 
ensure it has a prosperous future. In order for this to be achieved, concrete 
reforms must be introduced into all sectors of society such as the Greek economy 
that is in dire need of productivity, innovation and entrepreneurship. 
As such, Greece must move away from its current statism toward a 
decentralised government where power is distributed through various levels of 
government, such as local, state and federal. Further, the Greek State must end its 
affair with cronyism, only appointing Ministers who are qualified as opposed to 
family, friends and associates. It must also stop its usage of nepotism by preventing 
MPs from using their positions of power to organise personal arrangements such 
as favouring such individuals for a public sector job because they are from the 
same village. Further, all forms of corruption must be addressed through the strict 
enforcement of rules and regulations, particularly the accepting of bribes by 
politicians. 
In addition to the public sector which is discussed below, clientelism is deeply 
entrenched in the Greek political system amongst MPs and all politicians. As such, 
action must be taken by the Greek State to combat the practice to ensure the 
granting by politicians of special handouts for votes is abolished, with the only 
benefits to constituents coming in the form of welfare. The Greek Government 
must end the practice of regulated professions and closed shops, particularly on 
industries that are Greece's strongest such as tourism and shipping, by lifting 
restrictions and opening the markets to private enterprises. Finally, an end must be 
put toward waste and red tape practices so that the various and pointless 
bureaucratic procedures that simply waste people's time and money such as 
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needed fifteen pieces of documentation for a death certificate are replaced with 
functioning and professional procedures throughout Greek society.559 
 
7. Checks and Balances 
It is evident that Greece is largely in its current state due to the complete absence 
of checks and balances into the separation of powers, and as such, the legislative or 
the Hellenic Parliament must first be completely independent of the executive and 
judiciary. Reduced to 120 seats, MPs of the Hellenic Parliament should only be 
responsible for creating the laws that govern the country. The Greek President, 
however, should be granted further powers to ensure the Hellenic Parliament 
functions properly, namely the ability to control its procedure in cases of a hung 
parliament and ability to veto laws created by the Hellenic Parliament. A veto by the 
Greek President can only be overridden by a majority vote in the Hellenic 
Parliament.   
In addition, the executive or Hellenic Government must also be completely 
independent of the legislative and judiciary. The Prime Minister and Ministers 
should only be responsible for enforcing the laws in the day to day functioning of 
the country. Such responsibility should be in strict accordance with the Greek 
Constitution, laws and the manifesto of the political party in power. To ensure this 
effectively, the Greek President should be given the power to ensure all MPs are 
accountable for the things they say and more importantly, the things they do, 
particularly when a majority party is in power. 
Finally, the judiciary or Hellenic Courts must also be completely independent 
of the executive and legislative. The role of the Hellenic Courts should solely be the 
interpretation of the law without any interference whatsoever with the power to 
declare created laws by the legislative as well as the acts by the executive as 
unconstitutional without the prospect of political immunity. Here, the Greek 
President should have the power to appoint the judges of the Hellenic Courts. In 
turn, the Hellenic Courts can declare such choices as unconstitutional if they so 
wish.560 
 
8. Public Sector 
While the Greek public sector is undeniably too large to sustain and in dire need of 
reform, the current policy of simply firing or cutting salaries has proven to be 
completely destructive for the majority of Greeks. Such decisions have been made 
and implemented by MPs who are nonetheless part of the Greek elite and see their 
citizens in terms of numbers rather than people. The downsizing of the public 
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sector is thus not a phenomenon that can be achieved overnight or even in a few 
years but gradually over many years. Measures should be put in place to ensure 
those who cannot remain staffed are helped to acquire employment in the private 
sector. 
This is of particular importance if the Greek Government is to continue its 
policy of deepening privatisation in the country in an effort to transform the Greek 
economy into a mixed economy. As the crisis looms, the Greek Government can 
negotiate with investors who are interested in Greece and discuss the potential 
lowering of selling prices in exchange for the permanent employment of laid-off 
Greeks from the public service. Initiatives such as these would not be rejected as 
the majority of Greeks who have lost their jobs have not found employment 
elsewhere and have resulted in leaving the country. Thus, their inclusion would 
prevent others from leaving and would be help Greek professionals return. 
However, in order for this to be achieved, clientelism as well as other 
embedded practices detrimental to the country, must be countered through a 
serious employment scheme introduced by the government and enforced by a 
regulatory organisation. This would firstly evaluate potential and current employees 
to determine who should remain in the public sector based on experience and 
qualifications, not the prospect of a position or benefit in exchange for votes. The 
scheme would also serve as a guideline for the Greek Government regarding the 
workload of its employees which would nonetheless increase the low productivity 
of the public sector with a zero0tolerance policy for a quicker or more effective 
service in exchange for a bribe. Furthermore, it would outline the strict scales of 
pay for public servants, their annual and sick leave and that prohibits behind the 
scenes deals, red tape arrangements or other extra benefits in exchange for a 
favour.561 
 
9. Security 
In order for Greece to improve its national security, the Greek Government must 
adopt a ‘quality over quantity’ policy, similar to that of Israel, that begins with 
maintaining Greek military expenditure at a stable 3% of GDP, although used more 
effectively. The first part of this policy would be closing the divide between 
conscripted personnel and professional personnel. In addition, Greece should 
decrease its arms imports, particularly of second hand and even third-hand 
equipment. There must be a revision and overhaul of Greece’s numerous land, air 
and sea bases that are spread all over the country. 
                                                            
561 Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, Understanding the Crisis in Greece: From Boom to Bust, Chapter 5 
105 
 
Although Greece should maintain conscription, it is imperative that it 
decrease the amount of conscripts per annum so that the overall nominal strength 
of personnel can be altered from approximately 134,000 to 120,000. By maintaining 
a professional to conscripted ratio of 4-1, Greece can ensure its smaller force are 
trained at a higher level. By decreasing arms imports of old equipment, Greece 
should focus on slowly re-establishing its own military industry, with the assistance 
of technologically advanced countries such as the US, Israel or Russia, so that it is 
able to develop modern equipment. Finally, by shrinking the number of bases, 
Greece can reevaluate and reorganise in strategic positions so that the country is 
defendable in case of an attack. 
In accordance with a such a doctrine, Greece has a better opportunity to 
maintain both the defence of the Greek people and Greek sovereignty. While its 
greatest rival and threat is an ally in NATO, Turkey maintains an aggressive policy 
against Greece, namely in the Aegean Sea as well as in Western Thrace, which 
Greece must be prepared for in case of future escalations. Further, Greece faces 
another threat it must be prepared for from NATO ally Albania, which as of recently 
has raised the issue of the Chams in Greek Epirus in an attempt to destabilise its 
border with Greece, as it did with Serbia over Kosovo and the FYR over what it 
terms Illirida. Finally, Greece’s final threat from a neighbouring country comes for 
the FYR, and although such a threat is relatively low, the FYR continues its hostility 
toward Greece by claiming Greek Macedonia, both geographically and culturally, 
which Greece must be cautious of.562 
 
10. Elites 
Since 1821, and more so since 1974, Greek elites have had an abundance of power 
and influence over the Greek State. The Greek State must, therefore, adopt a zero 
tolerance to such individuals and deal with them decisively. While Greek elites will 
always be in Greece, measures can be taken to ensure they are slowly removed 
from the Greek political system. In an effort to demonstrate this to the Greek 
people, this would include a variety of reforms implemented by the Hellenic 
Parliament, Hellenic Government and Hellenic Courts. 
It is, therefore, necessary for the Hellenic Parliament to introduce laws that 
restrict Greek elites from participating in Greek politics. Such restrictions should be 
placed on current Greek elites, their family members and associates for the next 
three generations. While somewhat severe, it would ensure Greek elites are not 
able to secure positions such as the Prime Minister, Ministers, Chief of the Armed 
Forces, to name a few. Further, the Greek Government, with the assistance of the 
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EU, should implement an effective taxation law such as the pothenesches, as well as 
establishing a new Hellenic Taxation Office. The point of such a reform and new 
institution will task the latter with forming a Hellenic Commission that investigates 
the tax evasion and corruption by Greek politicians and wealthy citizens with an 
elitist background. 
 If any peculiarities arise with both current and past MPs such as Kostas 
Karamanlis, the Hellenic Police should be informed whereby these individuals 
should be charged and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law and allow the 
Hellenic Courts to determine their future. However, if found guilty, such individuals 
and families should be made an example of and in addition to jail time, should be 
forced to pay back the Greek State the total amount of what they owe with interest. 
If they are unable to do so, their assets should be confiscated and sold. By 
removing Greek elites from the political system, Greece has a far greater chance of 
operating its democracy more effectively, particularly over Greek society, while 
avoiding future actions detrimental to the country.563 
 
11. Church of Greece 
While it cannot be denied that the Church of Greece and overall Greek Orthodox 
Church has plays a significant role in the life of Greeks, it is imperative that Greece 
adopts the policy of separation between Church and State. While the accusation is 
denied by the Church of Greece, its position within politics is an Ottoman-era 
creation used by the Turks as a means of controlling its subjects. In order for the 
separation to begin, the status of the Church of Greece must be removed from the 
Greek Constitution or any future constitutions. The involvement of religion in 
politics should also be completely addressed with employees of religious 
institutions barred from a political position. 
The removing of religious oaths by politicians would also prove useful as 
their oath should only be to the Greek people themselves. In addition, the Greek 
State must cease paying the salaries of anyone employed by the Church of Greece 
as well as the granting of tax exemptions, pensions and other benefits. In terms of 
its vast ownership of land, the Greek State must confiscate any property the Church 
of Greece owns that is not a church, monastery or religious school. Religion in the 
education system, in this case, Orthodoxy, must also be altered in Greek public 
schools and taught, in addition to other religions such as the ancient Greek religion, 
from a secular perspective. 
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If a religious organisation such as the Church of Greece wishes to teach 
Orthodoxy from a religious perspective, this should only be done in religious 
academies. Furthermore, religious holidays, which are vast, should not be given the 
status of a public holiday with the exception of days of cultural significance such as 
Christmas, Easter and Great Feasts. It is also important that steps are taken for the 
Autocephalous Church of Hellas to be dissolved and placed under the jurisdiction 
of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople to ensure that the National 
Church no longer exists and that the overall Greek Orthodox Church functions on 
an organisational level under the Greek State, not part of or over the Greek State. 
Such policies, however, should be applied to all religious organisations in the 
country.564 
 
12. Summary 
It can, therefore, be concluded that while Greek institutions have come a long way 
in the post-Metapolitefsi period, they must be severely reformed by the Greek State. 
The starting point for any Greek politician is the writing of a completely new, 
modern and secular Greek Constitution. There should also be a clear and basic 
Greek Nationality Code that outlines who is entitled to Greek citizenship based on 
the principles of jus sanguinis, jus matrimonii and jus soli. If these Greek citizens are 
to have faith in their representatives, politicians must begin to deliver on their 
promises as part of their duties in a representative democracy and also introduce 
direct democracy on important issues. 
To be effective politicians, there must be an introduction of a Hellenic 
Elections Commission that replaces the current leadership culture with a set of 
rules and regulations that all parties must adhere to. Once in government, these 
parties must abide by the Greek constitution and laws at all times and at the 
present time, focus on phasing out the ongoing cronyism, statism, nepotism, 
clientelism, corruption, regulated professions or ‘closed shops’, and waste and red 
tape. More importantly, Greece must seriously introduce an effective system of 
checks and balances so all individuals part of the Hellenic Parliament, Hellenic 
Government and Hellenic Courts are accountable for their words and actions. While 
the public sector must be reduced and adopt a policy of hiring those most qualified 
and experienced, measures must be taken for laid off employees with assistance 
given toward their transfer into the private sector. 
In order to uphold its national security, Greece should adopt a new policy of 
quality over quantity by turning its overpopulated personnel, old equipment and 
numerous bases into more professional and trained personnel, new and modern 
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equipment and strategically placed bases. Elites, who have held onto power and 
influence since the establishment of the Greek State, must once and for all be held 
accountable through prosecution, punishment and ongoing monitoring for their 
looting of the Greek State, as well as being barred from the political system. Finally, 
there must be a separation of Church and State to ensure that no religion can 
influence the government and that the only authority in Greece is its constitution 
and laws. It is through these suggestions and propositions that Greece has a 
chance to finally and fully reform its institutions so that it can evolve into a more 
democratic nation-state within itself, in Europe and the world.565 
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Conclusion 
 
Despite the limitations mentioned in the Abstract, Methodology and Introduction, it 
can therefore be concluded that this thesis has contributed to this area of research 
by analysing the successes and failures of democratic institutions in Greece. 
Chapter 1 covered the period from 1821 – 1974, the year of the establishment of 
the Greek Nation State to the Papadopoulos Junta, and demonstrated the various 
institutions that embedded themselves in the country, including the constitution, 
citizenship, popular sovereignty, political parties, government, checks and balances, 
public sector, security, elites and finally, the Church of Greece. Chapter 2 covered 
the period from 1975 – 1985 or from the Metapolitefsi when Greece introduced the 
Greek Constitution 1975 and institutions developed under Konstantinos Karamanlis 
of ND and Andreas Papandreou of PASOK. Throughout this period, institutions 
begun their transformation in the new democratic Greece with successes including 
the writing of a new constitution up to the standards of the day, the 
implementation of popular sovereignty with a successful referendum on the type of 
government and first elections, the checks and balances exemplified in the powers 
of the President, and a clear and concise security policy to deter Turkey. 
However, there were failures with citizenship laws that started to distinguish 
between Greek and non-Greek, the establishment of political parties based on a 
leadership cult, governments based on national clientelism and more so under 
PASOK, which also stemmed down into the public sector, the furthering of tax fraud 
and scandals by elites and the implementation of the Church of Greece as the 
prevailing religion of the country. Chapter 3 covered the period from 1986 – 2000 or 
from the years Greece made its first revision to the Greek Constitution with the 
analysis of institutions under Costas Simitis of PASOK and Konstantinos Mitsotakis 
of ND. This period can be described with the most successes occurring including 
the granting of citizenship to numerous repatriated Greeks from the Diaspora, free 
and fair elections taking place with minor periods of instability, the persistence of 
party leaders to move away from the personality cult, good governance through 
modern reforms and a security manifesto that reflected Greece's interests in the 
region. However, it is nonetheless marked with failures that begin with the 
constitution itself with much of the power of the President going to the Prime 
Minister, the inability to implement successful checks and balances, the increase of 
public servants under the banner of clientelism, the rise of scandals involving elites 
and their associates, and the involvement of the Church of Greece into the affairs of 
the Greek State. 
Chapter 4 covered the period from 2001 – 2008 or from the years Greece 
made a further revision to the Greek Constitution up to Kostas Karamanlis of ND, 
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nephew of Konstantinos Karamanlis. A significant move in this period were the 
revisions of the Greek Constitution that served to undo many of the previous 
revisions such as implementing various articles dealing with the functions of the 
Greek State, as well as the successful elections that took place and the reform of 
the Hellenic Police, Intelligence Service and upkeep on the Greek Armed Forces. 
Unfortunately, however, this period can be described with numerous failures 
occurring under Karamanlis, namely his failure to introduce a fair Greek Nationality 
Code, lack of control over ND that favoured members of the old guard, inability to 
act at the right moment when in government, ignorance toward the very concept of 
checks and balances, creating an economic drain by employing seasonal public 
servants, and finally, involvement in monetary scandals in cooperation with the 
Church of Greece. Chapter 5 covered the period 2009 – 2016 or from the years the 
Greek Economic Crisis begun under George Papandreou of PASOK, Antonis 
Samaras of ND and Alexis Tsipras of SYRIZA, particularly taking into consideration 
the reforms of the EU. 
Throughout this period which continues until the present, the successes have 
included discussions for potential revisions to the Greek Constitution in accordance 
with EU standards, the awarding of citizenship to various individuals both Greek 
and non-Greek alike, promises of implementing checks and balances, again namely 
regarding the powers to be given to the President, and the prosecution of some 
elites with further work to be done due to their involvement in tax evasion. 
However, failures include a severe decrease in the turnout of Greek voters due to 
dissatisfaction, the return of populism across the political spectrum regarding all 
parties, the implementation of the harshest austerity measures, the persistence of 
clientelism in the public sector, a security manifesto that neglects various problems 
on Greece's borders, and while promised, the inability to begin discussions on the 
implementation of separating church from state due to the hold of the Church of 
Greece on the Greek Nation. Chapter 6 finally covers the future of Greece where 
various insights were given as to how democratic institutions can evolve toward a 
more democratic Greece, namely with the writing of a new constitution, a clear 
nationality code, the implementation of direct as well as parliamentary democracy, 
rules and regulations for political parties, effective governance without cronyism 
and the like, the implementation of checks and balances with specific power 
granted to the President, the combating of clientelism within the public sector, a 
quality over quantity security approach, the establishment of a new taxation system 
to deter elites and finally, the separation of church of state. After careful 
consideration, it can be argued that the thesis has effectively answered the 
fundamental question, what are the successes and failures of democracy and its 
institutions in post-1975 Greece? 
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While the thesis identifies the successes and failures of institutions in Greece 
over the last 41 years, it is imperative, in this research area, to note that Greece’s 
politicians depict the evolution of these institutions as an improvement to Greek 
citizens in an attempt to shield Greek society from their manipulation. Greek 
politicians are far greater concerned with achieving short term goals in the present, 
such as maintaining power through their parties, rather than achieving long term 
goals that look toward the future at bettering the country by improving its 
institutional framework. The most recent example of such an embedded and 
continuous problem is with the current SYRIZA-ANEL Government that has 
suggested introducing single proportionality into the electoral system so that 
political parties do not receive the extra 50 seats to form a majority government. 
While the notion is to ensure elections are conducted under a more democratic 
system, single proportionality should have been introduced years ago. 
More importantly, in the case of SYRIZA, which is expected to lose the next 
election based on current polls, the proposed act is but a political manoeuvre 
against their rivals ND so that when the latter is back in power, it will have 
difficulties at forming a majority government and will have to form a coalition 
government, most likely with SYRIZA. By using the Greek State itself in such a 
manner, Greek politicians have therefore proven time and again that they will do 
whatever it takes to fulfil personal interests as opposed to fulfilling the interests of 
the Greek Nation and State. It is therefore the responsibility of the Greek Nation, 
both in Greece and the Diaspora, to act in an attempt to ensure the various 
institutions in Greece can evolve with a true democratic end. It can therefore be 
concluded that while further research is needed in this area, the thesis significantly 
contributes to this research area by identifying the successes and failures of the 
most important institutions in Greece which impact its overall democratic (and 
undemocratic) system.  
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